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ARTICLES
Textualism's Selective Canons of
Statutory Construction: Reinvigorating
Individual Liberties, Legislative Authority,
and Deference to Executive Agencies
BY BRADFORD C. MANK7
INTRODUCTION
S mce President Reagan appointed him to the Supreme Court in
1986, Justice Antonin Scalia has led a revival of textualist
statutory interpretation on the Court. Textualist judges often use
traditional "canons" of statutory construction when interpreting a statute's
text. While canons of construction can be useful in statutory interpretation,
textualist judges selectively prefer clear-statement rules that favor states'
rights and private economic interests, and usually narrow a statute's
meaning. Clear-statement rules generally weaken legislative authority by
ignoring a statute's probable purpose unless Congress makes a very clear
statement in the text of its intent - for example, that it seeks to preempt
state legislation.
On the otherhand, textualistjudges are less likelyto invoke canons that
promote at least some types of individual rights or, surprisingly, the
interpretations of executive agencies. In part, this may be due to political
bias on the part of many textualist judges. In addition, textualism as a
methodology rejects indications of intent or purpose often found in
legislative history Furthermore, textualist judges appear less likely to
acknowledge that a statute is ambiguous and that it is appropriate to
consider canons or agency interpretations that broaden statutory meaning.
*Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati. B.A. 1983, Harvard University;
J.D. 1987, Yale Law School. I wish to thank Professor Philip Fnckey for his
comments on an earlier draft. All errors or omissions are my responsibility
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Professor Sunstem has proposed the most sophisticated modem
approach to using canons, which he calls "interpretive principles," to
address problems of statutory interpretation.' His model, however, offers
only limited aid in how to choose among conflicting canons. Furthermore,
his principles provide only a modest amount of guidance as to how broadly
or narrowly to apply a canon in a given case. It probably is not possible to
construct a model that answers all of these questions in every case.
This Article demonstrates that textualist judges, most notably Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and, to a lesser extent, Kennedy, have applied some canons
too aggressively, and slighted others. Textualist judges have overused
clear-statement rules that narrow statutory meaning, especially as a means
to promote federalism and states' rights. On the other hand, textualists have
neglected canons that promote individual liberty or executive authority
Because canons must be applied on a case-by-case basis and different
canons can conflict, it is impossible to formulate one rule for how they
should be applied. Nevertheless, the common textualist approach of
selectively favoring some canons at the expense of others is inappropriate
and courts need to strike a new balance in how they use canons.
Part I discusses the textualist approach to statutory interpretation and
its critics. Part II examines the traditional "canons" of statutory construc-
tion and how modem textualist judges have approached their use. Part m
shows that textualist judges often use clear-statement rules to narrow a
statute's scope, especially to promote states' rights or private economic
interests. Part IV suggests that textualist judges are often less vigorous
about promoting canons that favor certain kinds of individual constitutional
rights. Part V demonstrates that, contrary to the initial expectations of
many commentators, textualist judges appear less likely to defer to
executive agency interpretations of statutes. Part VI examines Professor
Sunstem's interpretive principles, including the difficult questions of how
broadly or narrowly to apply a canon and how to balance conflicting
canons. This Article concludes that courts should rein i their use of clear-
statement rules, but expand their use of canons that favor individual
liberties or executive deference.
I. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
There are three major or "foundationalist" theories of statutory
interpretation: (1) intentionalism; (2) purposivism; and (3) textualism.2
'Seegenerally Cass Sunstem, Interpreting Statutes in theRegulatory State, 103
HARV L. REv 405, 462-505 (1989) [hereinafter Sunstem, Interpreting Statutes]
(proposing interpretive principles for the regulatory state).
2 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P Frickey, Statutory Interpretation As
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv 321, 324-25 (1990) [hereinafter Eskridge
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While there are differences between the first two approaches, this Article
will refer to both intentionalism and purposivism as nontextualist
interpretation, and will treat textualism as a method largely separate from
the other two theories. Part I will emphasize how textualist interpretation
differs from nontextualist approaches.
A. Nontextualist Interpretation
Intentionalists traditionally examine both a statute's text and legislative
history to determine the original intent of the enacting legislature.3 By
contrast, purposivism goes beyond the legislature's original intent to
estimate the statute's spirit or purpose, because it may be difficult to
determine original intent or because a court must apply a statute to
circumstances that the enacting legislature did not foresee.4
& Fnckey, Statutory Interpretation] (arguing the three major theories of statutory
interpretation are "foundationalist" because "each seeks an objective ground
('foundation') that will reliably guide the interpretations of all statutes in all
situations."); see also Blake A. Watson, Liberal Construction of CERCLA Under
the Remedial Purpose Canon: Have the Lower Courts Taken a Good Thing Too
Far?, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV 199,211 n.46 (1996) (citing numerous articles on
statutory construction); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 13-47 (1994) (discussing weaknesses of intentionalism,
purposivism and textualism).
3 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 2, at 14-25 (describing and criticizing intention-
alism); John P Dwyer, The Pathology ofSymbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q.
233, 298-99 (1990); Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 2, at
327; Watson, supra note 2, at 211-12. Articles by leading intentionalists include
Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent andPublic Choice, 74 VA.
L. REV 423, 424 (1988) ("In our view, public choice theory is consistent with a
flexible, pragmatic approach to statutory construction, in which legislative intent
plays an important role."); Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence ofSkepticism, 86
MICH. L. REV 827 (1988); Kenneth Starr, OfForests and Trees: Structuralism in
the Interpretation of Statutes, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV 703 (1988); Dwyer, supra,
at 298 n.267 (listing Farber & Frickey, Posner, and Starr as leading intentionalist
scholars).
4 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 2, at 25-34 (describing and criticizing purposivism);
Watson, supra note 2, at 212, 214-15; see also HENRY M. HART, JR. &ALBERTM.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION
OF LAW 1378-79 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P Frickey eds., 1994) (the
classic formulation of a purposivist approach to statutory interpretation). An
example ofpurposivism is the conclusion by Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Chief Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. that a statute requiring "wntten votes"
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There are significant differences among modem intentionalists and
purposivists regarding to what extent they would allow judges to recon-
struct congressional intent or purpose when a statute's meaning is
ambiguous or it is silent about a particular issue. If there are ambiguities or
a "gap" in a statute, many purposivists try to construe the statute in light of
the assumption that the legislature was acting for the public good rather
than for some narrow interest group.5 A possible problem with a broad
purposivist approach is that the interpreter may be too likely to mterject her
own biases in ascertaining the intentions or purposes of Congress.
More recently, some scholars have proposed going beyond
intentionalism or purposivism, especially in cases in which the enacting
legislator did not anticipate new or changing circumstances.6 Some
proponents of "dynamic" statutory interpretation urge judges to reformu-
late statutes, especially those concerned with civil rights, in light of "public
values."7 Other scholars have proposed various modified versions of
intentionalism or purposivism that emphasize the need for statutory
interpreters to apply a "practical reason" that appropriately fits general or
ambiguous language to specific contextss or takes into account "how
allowed the use of voting machines that used no paper at all because the general
purpose of the statute was to prevent oral or hand voting. See In re House Bill No.
1,291, 60 N.E. 129 (Mass. 1901); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURIS-
PRUDENCE 267 (1990) [hereinafter POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE].
5 See HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at 1378 (refemng to "reasonable [legis-
lators] pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably"); Philip P Frickey, Marshalling
Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal
Indian Law, 107 HARV L. REV 381,407 (1993); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting
Public-RegardingLegislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group
Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv 223 (1986) (stating that courts, in interpreting statutes,
should not enforce "hidden-implicit" bargains favoring special interest groups, but
rather should treat statutes as having a public meaning); Watson, supra note 2, at
212, 215. But see POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 4, at 276-78 (arguing it is
difficult for courts to know whether a legislature's purpose in enacting a statute was
to serve the public interest or effect a compromise among interest groups).
6 See infra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
7 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 2, at 148-5 1, Dwyer, supra note 3, at 299 n.273; see
generally William Eskndge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA.
L. REV 1007 (1989) [hereinafter Eskridge, Public Values].
8 See Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 2, at 322 n.3
("By 'practical reason,' we mean an approach that eschews objectivist theories in
favor of a mixture of inductive and deductive reasoning (similar to the practice of
the common law), seeking contextual justification for the best legal answer among
the potential alternatives."); Farber & Frickey, supra note 3, at 469 (proposing a
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statutory interpretation will improve or impair the performance of
governmental institutions." 9
B. Textualism
1. Premises of Textualism
During the nineteenth century, courts abandoned their earlier emphasis
on equity and statutory purpose, making legislative intent the primary focus
of statutory interpretation."° Because it was often difficult to determine the
actual intent of the enacting legislature, both English and American courts
began to focus on the literal language, or, in other words, the "plain
meaning" of the statutory text.I' Justice Holmes was an early advocate of
a textualist approach to statutory interpretation, arguing that courts should
be concerned only with what Congress said, and not what it meant. 12 In
"practical reasoning" approach to understanding legislative intent that would allow
judges "as many tools as possible to help them m the difficult task of applying
statutes"); Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes,
Formalism, andtheRule ofLaw, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533,557-59 (1992) (criticizing
formalist approaches to statutory interpretation, including textualism, and arguing
m favor of a practical approach or Llewellyn's "situation sense," which involves
"the ability to classify a situation in the most useful and appropriate manner," thus
allowing one to examine a problem of statutory interpretation in light of statutory
context or purpose, id. at 557).
9 See Sunstem, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 1, at 466; see generally CASS
SUNSTErN, AFTERTHE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 113-17 (1990) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN,
AFTER THE RIGHTS].
o See Robert J. Martineau, Craft and Technique, Not Canons and Grand
Theories: A Neo-Realist View ofStatutory Construction, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV
1, 6-7 (1993).
" See Bradley C. Karkkanen, "Plain Meaning " Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence
of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 401, 433 (1994);
Martineau, supra note 10, at 7
12 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 41, 44 (1963);
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV L. REV
417,419 (1899). On occasion, however, Justice Holmes went beyond his textualist
theory to look at a statute's purpose. See, e.g., In re House Bill No. 1,291, 60 N.E.
129, 130 (Mass. 1901) (holding that a statute requirng "written votes" allowed the
use of voting machines that used no paper at all because the general purpose of the
statute was to prevent oral or hand voting); POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note
4, at 267 (noting that Holmes' suggested method of statutory interpretation was
whether it followed "the understanding of the normal English speaker").
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United States v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.,3 a 1929 case, the Supreme
Court strongly endorsed the "plain meaning" rule: "[W]here the language
of an enactment is clear and construction according to its terms does not
lead to absurd or impracticable consequences, the words employed are to
be taken as the final expression of the meaning intended."' 4
Just eleven years later, however, President Roosevelt's appointment of
several justices favorable to his New Deal led the Court in United States v.
American Truckng Ass'ns"5 to essentially repudiate the plain meaning
approach. It endorsed the consideration of legislative history and other
nontextual sources m determining congressional intent even if a statute's
text appeared to have a clear meaning: "When aid to construction of the
meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be
no 'rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear
on 'superficial examination."" 6 By the early 1980s, the Court consulted
legislative history in almost all its statutory cases, permitting Judge Patricia
Wald to posit that "although the Court still refers to the 'plain meaning'
rule, the rule has been effectively laid to rest."' 7
Since Justice Scalia jomed the Supreme Court in 1986, however, his
opposition to the use of legislative history and espousal of textualism has
had a important impact on the Court. 8 He has had some success m
convincing Justice Anthony Kennedy, who became a member of the Court
in 1987, to favor a textualist approach to interpretation, although Justice
Kennedy's approach has become less predictable in recent years, 9 and even
" United States v Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 278 U.S. 269 (1929).
141d. at 278.
United States v American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534 (1940).
1d. at 543-44 (quoting, respectively, Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v United
States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928), and Commissioner v New York Trust Co., 292
U.S. 455, 465 (1934) (using the phrase "superficial inspection")).
17 PatnciaM. Wald, Some Observations on the Use ofLegislative History in the
1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV 195, 195 (1983).
" See INS v Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., con-
currng) (advocating textualist approach to statutory interpretation); Gregory E.
Maggs, Reconciling Textualism and the Chevron Doctrine: In Defense ofJustice
Scalia, 28 CONN. L. REv. 393,397-98 (1996); infra notes 21-25 and accompanying
text.
9 See, e.g., Public Citizen v Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 472-77
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring). While initially he was Justice Scalia's closest ally
on the Court, Justice Kennedy has in recent years been willing on some occasions
to join opinions relying upon legislative history See, e.g., Wisconsin Public
Intervenor v Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610 n.4 (1991); Farber, supra note 8, at 546
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greater success with Justice Thomas, who was appointed in 1991.20
Numerous commentators have discussed the rise during the late 1980s and
1990s of what Professor Eskridge has termed a "new textualist" movement
on the Court.' Largely because of Justice Scalia's influence, only a few of
the Court's decisions during the early 1990s reviewed legislative history,
and no majority opinion relied upon legislative history as a determinative
factor?2 Nevertheless, a majority of the Supreme Court has remained open
to nontextualist interpretation, and Justice Scalia often files a concurring
opinion if the majority includes an analysis of a statute's legislative
history 2 One commentator recently suggested that the Court is moving
away from Justice Scalia's approach to textualism and that even Scalia
himself has modified his textualist approach to look at a broader range of
meaning of statutory language.2 However, even that commentator
concedes that Scalia's textualist approach continues to have a major
influence on the rest of the Court.
25
Textualists believe that interpreters should not focus on the highly
subjective issue of the intentions of the enacting legislators, but instead
should assess what the ordinary reader of a statute would have understood
the words to mean at the time of enactment to ascertain a statute's "plain"
n.76.
2 See Thomas W Merrill, Essay, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron
Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351 (1994) [hereinafter Merrill, Textualism] (stating
that Justice Thomas appears to share Justice Scalia's views about textualist
interpretation); mnfra notes 176-84, 197-207, 242-48, 283-87 and accompanying
text.
21 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 2, at 120 (contrasting "Kennedy's lenient textual-
ism" with "Scalia's dogmatic textualism"), id. at 226-34 (discussing and criticizing
Scalia's "new textualism"); William N. Eskndge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37
UCLA L. REV 621 (1990) [hereinafter Eskridge, New Textualism] (describing
Justice Scalia's approach to statutory interpretation as the "new textualism");
Martineau, supra note 10, at 12; Thomas W Merrill, Judicial Deference to
Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 990-91 (1992) [hereinafter Merrill,
Judicial Deference].
2 See Maggs, supra note 18, at 398.
2 See Karkkamen, supra note 11, at 401 ("Only Justices Anthony Kennedy and
Clarence Thomas can be called adherents of Justice Scalia's plain meaning
approach."); Lawrence M. Solan, Learning OurLimits: The Decline of Textualism
in Statutory Cases, 1997 WIS. L. REv 235, 263-64 (Supreme Court has continued
in a limited way to use legislative history despite Justice Scalia's criticisms).
24 See Solan, supra note 23, at 240, 269.
" See id. at 283; see also infra notes 197-207,209-12,231,250-56,322-26 and
accompanying text.
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meaning.26 Textualists generally oppose both mtentionalist andpurposivist
theories of statutory construction as giving the judiciary too great a role in
deciding the meaning of a statute,27 and argue that a statute's text alone
provides the best evidence for interpretation. 8 Compared to traditional
textualists, however, a new textualist such as Justice Scalia "examines not
only the specific statutory language which is the subject of litigation, but
the entire statute as reflected by other legislation enacted by the same
legislature,"'29 and confirms that textual reading of the entire statute by
"examination of the structure of the statute, interpretations given similar
statutory provisions, and canons of statutory construction.""0 In Green v.
Bock Laundry Machine Co.,'1 Justice Scalia's concurring opinion argued:
The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined, not on
the basis of which meaning can be shown to have been understood by a
larger handful of the Members of Congress; but rather on the basis of
which meaning is (1) most in accord with context and ordinary usage, and
26 See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (arguing judges should seek statutory meaning "most in accord with
context and ordinary usage"); Merrill, Textualism, supra note 20, at 352 (stating
new textualists seek an objective method to determine how an ordinary reader of
a statute would have understood its words at the time of its enactment); Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court 's New Hypertextualism: An lnvitation to Cacophony
andIncoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REv 749,750 (1995);
infra notes 36, 45-50 and accompanying text.
27 See Maggs, supra note 18, at 396-97; Antonin Scalia, The Rule ofLaw as a
Law ofRules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv 1175, 1176 (1989). But see ESKRIDGE, supra note
2, at 232-33 (criticizing Scalia's argument that textualism imposes more reliable
restraints onjudicial discretion).
2 See SUNSTEIN, AFTERTHE RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 113 (describing textualist
view that "the statutory language is the only legitimate basis for interpretation").
But see id. at 113-17 (criticizing textualist statutory interpretation); ESKRIDGE,
supra note 2, at 34-47, 230-34 (describing and criticizing textualism); Dwyer,
supra note 3, at 298-99; Eskridge & Fnckey, Statutory Interpretation, supra note
2, at 327; Watson, supra note 2, at 212-13.
29 Robert J. Araujo, The Use ofLegislative History in Statutory Interpretation:
A Lookat Regents v. Bakke, 16 SETON HALLLEGIS. J. 57,73 (1992); see Eskndge,
New Textualism, supra note 21, at 661-62 (citing Kungys v United States, 485 U.S.
759, 770 (1988), and United States v Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 449-51 (1988));
Martineau, supra note 10, at 12.
30 Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 21, at 623-24; see also Martineau,
supra note 10, at 12.
3' Green v Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
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thus most likely to have been understood by the whole Congress which
voted on the words of the statute (notto mention the citizens subject to it),
and (2) most compatible with the surrounding body of law into which the
provision must be integrated - a compatibility which, by a benign fiction,
we assume Congress always has m mind.32
Probably the most obvious difference between modem textualism and
other schools of statutory interpretation is that textualists commonly
oppose the use of legislative history when judges interpret statutory text.
33
Especially if a statute's text has a clear or "plain" meaning, textualists
believe that it is unnecessary or improper for judges to examine either its
legislative history or the legislature's implicit purposes in enacting the
measure.34 Textualists and other critics of legislative history often argue
that its usefulness is overrated because it frequently is more confusing than
the text.35 Moreover, textualists frequently worry that judges will selec-
tively use legislative history to support their own policy preferences.
36
32 Id. at 528 (Scalia, J., concurring).
31 See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting
Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV 845, 861-69 (1992) (discussing five reasons textualists
refuse to consider legislative history); Maggs, supra note 18, at 397; Bradford C.
Mank,Is a TextualistApproach to Statutory Interpretation Pro-Environmentalist?"
Why Pragmatic Agency Decisionmaking is Better Than Judicial Literalism, 53
WASH. & LEE L. REV 1231, 1268-71 (1996); John F Manning, Textualism as a
Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV 673,673,684-90 (1997) [hereinafter
Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine]; Arthur Stock, Note, Justice
Scalia's Use of Sources in Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation: How
Congress Always Loses, 1990 DUKE L.J. 160 (criticizing Justice Scalia for not
considering legislative history).
4 See INS v. Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. 421,452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., con-
cumng) (arguing that if statutory text has a "plain meaning" it is unnecessary to
examine a statute's legislative history); Karkkamen, supra note 11, at 433-39
(arguing Justice Scalia frequently uses "plain meaning" to exclude the use of
legislative history); Watson, supra note 2, at 213 n.53 (same).
35 See Breyer, supra note 33, at 861-62; Martineau, supra note 10, at 14.
36 See Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 617 (1991) (Scalia,
J., concurring) ("We use [committee reports] when it is convenient, and ignore
them when it is not"); Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 192 (1988) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (arguing it is "dangerous to assume that, even with the utmost self-
discipline,judges can prevent the implications they see from mirroring the policies
they favor" when relying on legislative history); Karkkainen, supra note 11, at 423-
24. But see Breyer, supra note 33, at 862 (arguing legislative history can be
misused, but still has utility and should be considered).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Additionally, textualists often argue that it is improper for judges to
consider legislative history because such material fails the "presentment"
requirement of the Constitution, under which only a bill that both houses
of Congress have enacted and the President has signed (or that has been
enacted by Congress despite the President's veto) has legal authority 37 A
related argument is that legislative history is less accessible than statutory
texts to the general public, and, therefore, judges should not consider such
material."8 Furthermore, because only a committee comprised of a few
members of Congress or unelected staff employees typically produces such
material, committee reports or remarks by legislators m the congressional
record may not reflect the intent of Congress as a whole. 9 Textualists
sometimes argue that the whole concept of "intent" is meaningless when
considering a large legislative body, and, accordingly, that judges should
examine only the texts that legislatures actually enact rather than misguid-
edly search for a chimerical legislative "intent" that cannot exist among
" Justice Scalia believes that the constitutionally mandated role of federal
courts is to interpret the actual statutory text approved by both chambers of the
House and presented to the president, and, therefore, that courts should not
consider legislative history written by committees or individual members of
Congress. See, e.g., West Virginia Univ Hosps., Inc. v Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98-99
(1991); Thompson, 484 U.S. at 192 (Scalia, J., concurring); Maggs, supra note 18,
at 396; Muriel Monsey Spence, The Sleeping Giant: Textualism as Power Struggle,
67 S. CAL. L. REv 585, 586 (1994); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and
the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory
Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV 1295, 1300-01 (1990) (discussing textualist
argument that Presentment Clause of Constitution requires judges to look at only
statutory text). Cf INS v Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 925-32 (1983) (one-house
legislative veto violates requirements of bicameralism and presentment set forth m
Article I). But see ESKRIDGE, supra note 2, at 230-32 (criticizing Scalia's
bicameralism and presentment arguments).
38 See, e.g., United States v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 319-21
(1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (expressing concern about the use of legislative
history because it is not widely available); Kenneth W Starr, Observations About
the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 377 [hereinafter Starr,
Observations] (arguing that it is "vastly hard[ ] and impracticable" to search all
aspects of the legislative history that relate to potential problems in a controversy).
But see Breyer, supra note 33, at 869 (arguing judges should consider legislative
history because citizens can obtain legislative history); Martineau, supra note 10,
at 15.
" See Mank, supra note 33, at 1268-71, Manning, Textualism as a Non-
delegation Doctrne, supra note 33, at 684-90.
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hundreds of legislators.4" Justice Scalia has expressed the textualist canon
as follows: "Judges interpret laws rather than reconstruct legislators'
intentions."' 1 Textualists also argue that the widespread use of legislative
history only dates from the 1890s, that other countries interpret statutes
without resorting to legislative history, and, accordingly, that it simply is
not needed as a means to interpret statutes.42 Nevertheless, while Justice
Scalia's academic writings consistently take the position that it is improper
for judges to consider legislative history, he has been willing at times to
consider such material in his judicial opinions m order to corroborate the
intent disclosed by textual analysis of a statute43 and conveniently reach a
result similar to the result he would reach through pure textualism. 4
Textualists are usually less policy-oriented than most proponents of
purposivism, modified intentionalism, or dynamic statutory interpretation,
but Justice Scalia recognizes that judges can take into account policy
considerations as long as they do so m a way that gives primacy to a
statute's text.45 Adherence to the statutory text must be the norm m a
democratic society, and, therefore, if a text mandates an unpopular result
it is up to Congress, rather than unelectedjudges or bureaucrats, to make
a new policy choice.4 As a practical matter, it is difficult for either courts
or agencies to formulate a test of when circumstances have changed
40 See Mank, supra note 33, at 1268-71, Manning, Textualism as a Non-
delegation Doctrine, supra note 33, at 684-90.
41 INS v Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., con-
curring).
41 See Starr, Observations, supra note 38, at 374. But see Breyer, supra note 33,
at 867-68 (arguing judges should consider legislative history because statutes are
both more numerous and complex than m the past); Martineau, supra note 10, at
15.
43 SeeBabbittv. SweetHome Chapter of Communities fora Great Or., 515 U.S.
687,714-16 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing legislative history confirms his
reading of"ordinary" meaning of "take" and "harm"); Karen P Sheldon, "It's Not
My Job to Care" Understanding Justice Scalia's Method of Statutory
Interpretation Through Sweet Home and Chevron, 24 B.C. ENvTL. AFF L. REV
487, 503 (1997).
" See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989); Carlos E.
Gonzalez, Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74 N.C. L. REV 585, 604 n.66
(1996).
4 See infra text accompanying notes 49, 54.
46 See Dwyer, supra note 3, at 285; Carolyn McNiven, Comment, Using Sever-
ability Clauses to Solve the Attainment Dilemma in Environmental Statutes, 80
CAL. L. REV 1255, 1302 (1992).
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sufficiently or a statute's goals are too impractical monetarily to enforce.47
Once a court or agency is cut loose from the text of a statute, it may be
difficult for it to decide how to reformulate congressional policy 48 Some
textualists, including Justice Scalia, may refuse to enforce a text's
commands if doing so would produce "absurd" results,49 but they would be
less likely than purposivists to substitute alternative language for flawed
statutory language because only Congress may enact corrective
legislation."
Most textualists acknowledge that statutory texts are not always clear,
and use certain standard extrinsic aids to interpretation, including the
statute's structure,"' priorjudicial opinions,52 established judicial "canons"
of statutory construction,"3 administrative norms underlying the statute's
implementation, 4 comparisons with the accepted interpretations of
comparable statutory provislons, s5 and the dictionary meanings most
4 See Dwyer, supra note 3, at 285.
48 See id.
49 See K Mart Corp. v Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 324 n.2 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring m part and dissenting m part) ("[I]t is a venerable principle that a law
will not be interpreted to produce absurd results."); ESKRIDGE, supra note 2, at 134
("[B]y allowing an 'absurd result' exception to his dogmatic textualism, Scalia
allowed for just as much indeterminacy, and just as much room forjudicial play,
as he accused Brennan of creating with his context-dependent approach to statutory
meaning."); nfra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
5 0See McNiven, supra note 46, at 1302.
5' See Smith v United States, 508 U.S. 223,241 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("It is a 'fundamental principle of statutory construction (and, indeed, of
language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but
must be drawn from the context m which it is used.' ") (quoting Deal v United
States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993)); Green v Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S.
504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing judges should glean statutory
meaning from the interpretation "(1) most in accord with context and ordinary
usage and (2) most compatible with the surrounding body of law into which the
provision must be integrated. "); Frank II. Easterbrook, Text, History, and
Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 61 (1994);
Merrill, Textualism, supra note 20, at 352; Spence, supra note 37, at 586.
52See Manning, Textualism as aNondelegationDoctrne, supra note 33, at 673,
702-05; supra note 30 and accompanying text; infra note 485 and accompanying
text..
" See Maggs, supra note 18, at 396; Spence, supra note 37, at 586; nfra notes
105-21, 139-51, 158, 211,250-56, 258, 302, 487-90 and accompanying text.
5' See Spence, supra note 37, at 586; infra notes 404-05, 483-84 and accom-
panying text.
" See Spence, supra note 37, at 586.
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congruous with ordinary English usage and applicable law 56 Textualists
use external sources to find the meaning most consistent with the
"ordinary" usage of language contemporaneous with the enactment of the
statute. 7 In Chisom v. Roemer,5" Justice Scalia stated that judges should
"first, find the ordinary meaning of the language m its textual context; and,
second, using established canons of construction, ask whether there is any
clear indication that some permissible meaning other than the ordinary
applies."59
Even if one agrees that finding the "ordinary meaning" of a text should
be the primary focus of statutory interpretation, there is still the question
of what to do if Congress is careless or unclear in how it uses language.
While Scalia recognizes that Congress does not always write clear statutes
and that the "plain meaning" of a text is not necessarily always what
Congress intended, he contends that a textualist approach to statutory
construction, including the adoption of clear interpretive rules, will lead
Congress to be more diligent and precise in drafting them so that the
average English speaker can understand their meaning.
60
2. Criticisms of Textualism
Even critics of textualism acknowledge "that the statutory text is the
most authoritative interpretive criterion."'" To some extent, the revival of
textualism during the 1980s was a healthy reaction to the misuse by many
judges of legislative history 
62
56 See id.
" See Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Func-
tion ofPlam Meaning, 1990 S. CT. REV 231, 250 (explaining that plain meaning
approach enables the author to "converse with an English speaker with whom [he
has] nothing m common but [their] shared language").
58 Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
59Id. at 404 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
oSee, e.g., Finley v United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989); see also Schauer,
supra note 57, at 250 (noting that the plain meaning approach enables the author
to "converse with an English speaker with whom [he has] nothing in common but
[their] shared language."). But see ESKRIDGE, supra note 2, at 233-34 (criticizing
Scalia's "democracy enhancing" argument).
61 Eskridge & Fnckey, Statutoy Interpretation, supra note 2, at 354; see also
Frickey, supra note 5, at 408 n. 119 (observing that while many judges are not
textualists, all judges are "presumptive textualists" who "follow relatively clear
statutory language absent some strong reason to deviate from it"); Watson, supra
note 2, at 243 n.191.
62See ACLU v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 823 F.2d 1554, 1583 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (Starr, J., dissenting) ("We in the judiciary have become shamelessly
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Nevertheless, numerous commentators have attacked the textualist
approach to statutory construction. While a textualist approach is supposed
to increase courts' fidelity to congressional intent, textualist statutory
interpretation may actually decrease legislative powerbyreading the "plain
language" of a statute too narrowly or broadly in a way that thwarts the
intent of most members of Congress.6" In many cases, because words or
combinations of words have multiple meanings, an examination of a
statute's text in light of dictionary definitions or "ordinary" English usage
does not yield a single meaning, but instead raises numerous questions that
cannot be resolved without consulting some external source. 64 Because
dictionaries often include many possible definitions of a word, textualism
often is overinclusive, yielding a definition that may prohibit or include
profligate and unthinking in our use of legislative history "); Richard J. Pierce,
Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and
Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REv 749, 751 (1995)
(stating revival of textualism during 1980s was to some extent a healthy
development counteracting improper use of legislative history); Wald, supra note
17, at 197, 214 (discussing ability ofjudges to use selective portions of legislative
history); see also Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and
the Use of Legislative Histories: A Statistical Analysis, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 294
(1982) (presenting statistical study showing Supreme Court increasingly used
legislative history from 1938 to 1979, and that the increase in usage was especially
rapid after 1970).
63 See, e.g., West VirginiaUniv. Hosps., Inc. v Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 102 (1991)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court uses the implements ofliteralism to wound,
rather than to minister to, congressional intent "); id. at 112-16 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Congress is more likely to override textualist
interpretations of statutes and that majority's textualist interpretation is less
constant to Congress' intent than dissent's less verbatim reading); Michael Herz,
Judicial Textualism Meets CongressionalMicromanagement:A Potential Collision
in Clean Air Act Interpretation, 16 HARv ENVTL. L. REV 175, 204 (1992);
Spence, supra note 37, at 588; see generally Stock, supra note 33.
64 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 2, at 38-47 (criticizing textualist approaches to
statutory interpretation on ground that in difficult cases there are always textual
ambiguities); Stephen F. Ross, TheLimitedRelevance ofPlain Meaning, 73 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1057, 1064-65 (1995) (stating English language alone cannot supply
definitive meaning); see also LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES
113-17 (1993) (showing how ineptly judges use statutory language to define the
meaning of a statute and criticizing Justice Scalia in particular); Clark D.
Cunningham et. al, Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 YALE L.J. 1561 (1994)
(stating words often have multiple meanings and therefore attempts to define a
single "plain language" interpretation are flawed).
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practices that a reasonable legislature did not have m mind; for instance, a
state statute prohibiting vehicles m public parks surely did not intend to
exclude a monument consisting of vehicles from past wars.6 Less
frequently, a literal textual reading is undermclusive; for example, does a
statute applying to the theft of motor vehicles apply to stealing an airplane
on the ground if the statute only lists motorized vehicles that cannot fly"66
In addition, textualism by itself does not answer the question of what a
court should do if there is a gap m a statute or Congress has implicitly or
explicitly delegated lawmaking power to courts or agencies. 67 Furthermore,
changes m social circumstances may make it impractical or unwise to
implement a statute precisely as it is written.
6
Additionally, while textualists normally refuse to consider legislative
history, except perhaps to confirm their reading of a text, they often
inconsistently consult a number of other extnnsic sources, including
dictionaries, prior judicial opinions, and canons of construction, that fail
the presentment test.69 Accordingly, many commentators argue that if
judges are allowed to consult some extrinsic sources, they should be able
to examine all extrinsic sources, including legislative history, as a means
to reconstruct Congress's intent in enacting a statutory provision, particu-
larly where the textual terms are ambiguous. 70
In his dissenting opinion in West Virginia University Hospital, Inc. v.
Casey,71 Justice Stevens argued that textualist statutory interpretations
cause significant practical problems because Congress is much more likely
to override the Court's statutory interpretations if it ignores a statute's
legislative history 72 While Congress overrides only a small number of
65 See Sunstem, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 1, at 419-20.
66 See McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931) (holding that National
Motor Vehicle Theft Act did not apply to airplanes); Sunstem, Interpreting Stat-
utes, supra note 1, at 420-21.
67 Sunstem, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 1, at 421-22.
68 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 2, at 125-28 (using a hypothetical involving a
directive to "fetch five pounds of soup meat every Monday" to illustrate need to
consider changed circumstances); Sunstem, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 1, at
422-23.
69 See Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, supra note 33, at 673,
702-05; supra note 37 and accompanying text.
" See Abner J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's Observations, 1987 DUKE L.J.
380, 386; Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper- The Use ofLegislative History
in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term ofthe UnitedStates Supreme Court, 39
AM. U. L. REV 277,309 (1990).
7' West Virginia Umv. Hosp., Inc. v Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991).
7 See id. at 112-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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judicial decisions each year, there is some empirical evidence to support
Stevens's view that textualist decisions by the Supreme Court are
disproportionately rejected.7" Indeed, just eight months after Justice Scalia
wrote his West Virginia University Hospital decision, Congress enacted
legislation overriding the case by allowing courts to award expert fees m
civil rights cases.74
I. STATUTORY CANONS
Courts have long used canons of construction to interpret statutes.
Justice Scalia and other "new" textualists, however, arguably use the
canons somewhat differently from nontextualist judges. Textualists use
grammatical, structural, and "clear statement"7 5 canons of construction
primarily to narrow statutory meaning.76
A. Traditional Canons of Statutory Construction
Since at least the sixteenth century, Anglo-American judges have used
canons of statutory construction as guides to interpreting the meaning of
statutes.77 In 1584, Heydon's Case78 established four principles for deter-
' See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Inter-
pretations, 101 YALE L.J. 331, app. I at 424-41, app. I1 at 450-55 (finding
relatively strong evidence that Congress is more likely to override textualist
Supreme Court decisions by amending or enacting new legislation); Diane L.
Hughes, Justice Stevens's Method of Statutory Interpretation: A Well-Tailored
Means for Facilitating Environmental Regulation, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV 493,
497, 539-50 (1995) (arguing "Congress is less likely to override federal court
decisions involving statutory interpretation when such decisions are based on
substantive consideration of legislative history and policy"); Mank, supra note 33,
at 1273-74 (reviewing "some empirical studies [that] suggest Congress is more
likely to override textualist judicial interpretations of statutes than ones that
consider the relevant legislative history"); Michael E. Solimme & James L. Walker,
The Next Word: Congressional Response to Supreme Court Statutory Decisions,
65 TEMP L. REv 425, 451 (1992) (finding that empirical data on statutory
overrulings of Supreme Court decisions "lends some mild support to the view
expressed by Justice Stevens that textual decisions by the Court are often
overturned by Congress").
74 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 113(b), Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071,
1079; Solan, supra note 23, at 247
75Martineau, supra note 10, at 13.
76 See td., infra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
77 See Martineau, supra note 10, at 6-978 Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (K.B. 1584).
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mining a statute's purpose. 9 In his Commentaries, Blackstone listed ten
canons of statutory construction, including a canon that emphasized the
need forjudges to consider "equity" if a statute was ambiguous and another
that urged equitable construction of remedial statutes.8 0
In Varity Corp. v. Howe,"1 the Supreme Court gave the following
definition: "Canons of construction are simply 'rules of thumb' which
will sometimes 'help courts determine the meaning of legislation.' To
apply a canon properly one must understand its rationale." 2 In other words,
canons "are just aids to meaning, not ironclad rules."83
Another important question is, what constitutes a canon? 84 One answer
is that a canon is an interpretive principle that judges have customarily
used. Ultimately, judges decide what is a canon. Judges sometimes create
entirely new canons and apply them to pending cases.8"
1. Types of Canons
There are three main types of canons or interpretive principles: first,
syntactic principles, sometimes also referred to as grammatical or structural
canons, that use basic rules about language or logic to discern a particular
statute's meaning; second, Congress may establish implicit or explicit
interpretive principles about how courts should interpret a statute or
statutes; and, third, courts may employ broader substantive principles,
including constitutional mandates, to override even apparent legislative
intent. 86 Addressing the first principle, courts use a number of different
79 See id. at 638; Martineau, supra note 10, at 6.
80 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 87-92 (1766); Martineau,
supra note 10, at 7-9.
8' Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. Ct. 1065 (1996).82Id. at 1077 (quoting Connecticut Nat'l Bank v Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253
(1992)).
83 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC MEANING 638 (2d ed.
1995).
84 See Philip P. Fnckey, Faithfullnterpretation, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1085, 1090-
91 n.20 (1995).
85 See id.
86 See Cass R. Sunstem, Law andAdministration after Chevron, 90 COLUM. L.
REV 2071, 2106-07 (1990) [hereinafter Sunstem, Law and Administration]. But
see David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV 921, 925 (1992) ("I find far less warrant than [some modem
proponents of canons] do for dividing the canons into such categories as 'linguistic'
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syntactic principles, including rules about the "ordinary" meaning of a
word;87 the canon that a specific provision usually trumps a conflicting
general term;88 and the ejusdem generns principle that when general words
follow a particular enumeration, a court will usually limit the general words
to a meaning consistent with the particular enumeration.89 Next, Congress
has explicitly provided courts with both general and more specific rules
about statutory interpretation in the United States Code.9" There also are
nplicit interpretive principles that appear to reflect what one imagines any
reasonable legislature would prefer.91 These include the rule that courts
should prefer a construction that renders a statute valid rather than
invalid,92 and the principle that Congress intends that courts narrowly
construe appropriation statutes.93 Finally, courts may interpret a statute in
light of broad and often controversial concepts about the allocation of
authority among different governmental branches or entities, such as
federal preemption of state laws and executive conduct of foreign policy 94
2. Criticisms of Statutory Canons
In 1930, Max Radin assailed the canons as "in direct contradiction to
the habits of speech of most persons," 95 and in 1942 he recommended the
purposive approach to statutory construction.96 In 1950, Karl Llewellyn
wrote a classic article criticizing the use of canons to interpret statutes:
"[T]here are two opposing canons on almost every point. An arranged
selection is appended. Every lawyer must be familiar with them all: they
and 'substantive'; in my view, there is more to unify than to divide the canons that
are likely to make a difference in statutory interpretation.").87See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
8 8See, e.g., Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 734 (1989).
89See, e.g., Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411,419 (1990); Breminger v
Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local Union No. 6, 493 U.S. 67, 91-92 (1989).
But see United States v Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 90-91 (1975) (rejecting ejusdem
geners principle when it would lead to interpretation that conflicts with clear
congressional intent).
90 See 1 U.S.C. §§ 1-6 (1994); R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF STATUTES 262-81 (1975) (discussing examples).
91 See Sunsten, Law andAdministration, supra note 86, at 2107
92See Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 762 (1988).
9 See Tennessee Valley Auth. v Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190-91 (1978).
9 See Sunstem, Law andAdministration, supra note 86, at 2107
95 Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv L. REv 863, 873 (1930).96Max Radin, A Short Way with Statutes, 56 HARv L. REV 388, 409 (1942).
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are still needed tools of argument." 97 He appended a list of fifty-six canons
in two columns, including twenty-eight "Thrust" canons in the left-hand
column, and twenty-eight corresponding "Parry" canons in the right-hand
column.9"
Both Radin's and Llewellyn's criticism of the canons must be
understood in light of their general intellectual outlook. Both were
leading and brilliant members of a loosely defined group of scholars and
judges called "legal realists" that developed during the 1920s and 1930s.99
While the legal realists actually represented a wide range of views, they
were generally united by a common view that previous judges and
scholars had overemphasized the use of formal logic to explain legal
decisionmakmg. The realists maintained that the canons were deceptive
because they suggested judges could decide difficult issues of statutory
interpretation by using mechaical rules rather than a sensible exam-
mation of the statutory framework and legislative goals.100 Furthermore,
Llewellyn and other realists maintained that judges often used the
canons as post hoe rationalizations disguising the true reasons for their
decisions. 101
During the 1950s and 1960s, Professors Henry Hart and Albert Sacks,
leaders of the influential "legal process" approach at Harvard Law School,
criticized legal realism in general for overstating the indeterminacy of law,
and defended the use of statutory canons. 2 Many other modem commenta-
tors, most notably Judge Posner, however, have followed Radin's and
" Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons about How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV 395,
401 (1950); see also Jefferson B. Fordham & J. Russell Leach, Interpretation of
Statutes in Derogation of the Common Law, 3 VAND. L. REV 438 (1950)
(criticizing traditional canons of statutory construction).
98 Llewellyn, supra note 97, at 401-06.
99 See generally LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960, 3-44
(1986) (discussing legal realist movement during 1920s through 1950s, including
roles of Karl Llewellyn and Max Radin).
" See Richard Posner, Statutory Interpretation -In the Classroom and in the
Courtroom, 50 U. Cm. L. REV 800,805-06(1983); Sunstem,InterpretingStatutes,
supra note 1, at 451-52.
'0' See Sunstem, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 1, at 451.
102 See HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at 1191, Sunstem, Interpreting Statutes,
supra note 1, at 452 n. 164; see generally William N. Eskridge & Phillip P. Fnckey,
Introduction to HART & SACKS, supra note 4, at 1i (discussing Hart and Sacks'
defense of legal reasoning against the criticisms of legal realism).
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Llewellyn's critical approach to the canons.'03 As a result, the canons never
have enjoyed the same stature since Llewellyn's attack."°
3. Justice Scalia's Defense of the Canons
In his recent book, A Matter oflnterpretation,'05 Justice Scalia defends
the use of canons of construction against Karl Llewellyn's criticisms.' 6
Scalia argues that there really are not two widely used opposing canons on
"'almost every point.' "1 07 For instance, Llewellyn cited as his first canon,
"A statute cannot go beyond its text,"'' 8 and then as the opposing canon:
"To effect its purpose a statute may be implemented beyond its text."'' °9
While judges commonly employ the former canon, Scalia argues that
Llewellyn provides no authority for the use of the latter, opposing canon
and that it is not a generally accepted canon." 0 Scalia does concede,
however, that "some willful judges""' have used the canon, including the
Supreme Court in its important Holy Trinity"2 case."' He maintains,
nevertheless, that even if some judges have used the latter canon, it is the
sort of bad canonjudges should throw out." 4 Additionally, he contends that
he has never heard of Llewellyn's Parry No. 8: "'Courts have the power to
inquire into real - as distinct from ostensible - purpose."'"
Furthermore, Justice Scalia argues that most of Llewellyn's "Parnes"
do not contradict the corresponding canon, but simply demonstrate that it
is "not absolute."' 1 6 For instance, Scalia cites Llewellyn's Thrust No. 13,
"'Words and phrases which have received judicial construction before
enactment are to be understood according to that construction,' """ and
103 See Eskndge, New Textualism, supra note 21, at 663; Posner, supra note
100, at 805-17; Sunsten, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 1, at 452.
""4See Posner, supra note 100, at 805-17; Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra
note 1, at 452.
105 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 26-27 (1997).
'06 See id.
"o
7 Id. (quoting Llewellyn, supra note 97, at 401).
0 Llewellyn, supra note 97, at 401.
109 Id.
110 See SCALIA, supra note 105, at 26.
"'lId.
112 Church of the Holy Trinity v United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
113 See SCALIA, supra note 105, at 26-27
114 See id. at 27
"' Id. (quoting Llewellyn, supra note 97, at 402).
16Id. at27
17 Id. (quoting Llewellyn, supra note 97, at 403).
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Llewellyn's Parry" "'Not if the statute clearly requires them to have a
different meaning.'118
Scalia contends that canons are "simply one indication ofmeaning,"
119
and, accordingly, it is perfectly natural for a canon to yield to contrary
interpretations of meaning, including other canons.12° Recognizing that
canons cannot provide an absolute guide to statutory meaning, Scalia
concludes: "But that does not render the entire enterprise a fraud - not, at
least, unless the judge wishes to make it so." ''
Other commentators have agreed that Llewellyn overstated his
arguments that the canons are indeterminate and mconsistent.'2 Many
commentators have criticized Llewellyn's proposed substitute for the
canons - that judges make decisions by making" 'sense of the situation as
seen by the court' ,,u or "'sense as a whole out of our law as a whole' 1
24
- as far too vague and unstructured.'25
There is an argument for activejudicial use of the traditional canons of
construction. On the whole, they probably have a conservative bias, not in
the current political sense but in the older meaning as favoring the status
quo, or at most, moderate change.'26 For the judiciary, there are advantages
in using traditional methods of interpretation that have proven themselves
for several generations.' 27 By using the same background principles as their
predecessors when they interpret statutes, judges can promote the values
of consistency and continuity 12 Unless there are important constitutional
rights at stake or a common law regime has proven a failure over time and
there is a strong need for change, judges generally ought to serve as
instruments of continuity rather than radical change, to give litigants some
"8 Id. (quoting Llewellyn, supra note 97, at 403).
"1 SCALIA, supra note 105, at 27
120 See zd.
121 Id.
",See Shapiro,supra note 86, at 924-25; Sunstem, Interpreting Statutes, supra
note 1, at 441.
"~ Sunstem, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 1, at 452 (quoting Llewellyn,
supra note 97, at 397).
124 See Farber, supra note 8, at 537 n.21 (quoting Llewellyn, supra note 97, at
399).
" See Sunstem, InterpretingStatutes, supra note 1, at452 (criticizing Llewellyn's
situation sense formula). Butsee Farber, supra note 8, at 537 (defending Llewellyn's
basic situation sense formula).
126 See Shapiro, supra note 86, at 926, 941-50.
127 id. at 941-50; supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
" See Shapiro, supra note 86, at 925, 941-50.
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ability to predict judicial decisions. Accordingly, doctrine such as the
canons that promote the reading of statutes against existing customs should
be favored. 2 9 Moreover, to the extent the canons reflect experience with
how most legislators write statutes, the canons are more likely to reflect a
statute's probable intent than an individual judge's ad hoc approach to
interpreting an ambiguous phrase. 30 Furthermore, as Justice Scalia has
suggested, ifjudges apply consistent principles of interpretation, Congress
and state legislatures may eventually use language more carefully in
anticipation of how judges are likely to interpret a statute.'3 '
4. Substantive Canons
Modem commentators have recogmzed that Llewellyn largely
criticized grammatical or structural canons, not addressing substantive
canons in any depth.' Even if there is some truth to Llewellyn's critique
of the grammatical or structural canons of construction as lacking real
meaning and being contradictory, the substantive canons reflect real value
choices. 33 Indeed, while there are some relatively neutral ways to rank the
substantive canons, such as giving priority to fundamental constitutional
principles, 13 4 the substantive canons reflect evolving social and judicial
priorities much more than do the grammatical or structural canons.
Since the 1980s, commentators have emphasized the importance of
evaluating, changing, and creating substantive canons. 35 These commenta-
tors recognize that interpretive principles, especially substantive value
choices, remain a fundamental feature of modem law 136 Because statutes
often are ambiguous, courts must use interpretive principles of some sort
,29 See id. at 925.
'3 See id., supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text.
'3' See supra text accompanying note 60.
132 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Fnckey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw:
Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmakang, 45 VAND. L. REv 593, 595
(1992) [hereinafter Eskridge & Fnckey, Quasi-Constitutional Clear Statement
Rules].
13 See id. at 595-96.
134 See infra notes 508-23 and accompanying text.
131 See, e.g., Eskridge, Public Values, supra note 7, at 1011, Macey, supra note
5, at 264-66; see generally ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 83.
136 See Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 21, at 663; Posner, supra note
100, at 805-17; Shapiro, supra note 86, at 923; Sunstem, Law andAdministration,
supra note 86, at 2106; Sunstem, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 1, at 452-53.
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to decide their meaning.'17 Accordingly, as Part VIA will discuss, some
commentators have sought to develop a more refined list of canons of
construction and others have proposed more general interpretive principles
to aid m statutory interpretation.
138
B. Modern Textualism and the Canons
While textualism in theory ought to be relatively value neutral, modem
or "new" textualists, most notably Justice Scalia, often use "canons" of
statutory construction that narrow the interpretation of a statute.'3 9 "New
textualist" judges and commentators have tended to emphasize statutory
canons based upon grammar and logic, proceduralism, and federalism."4
On the other hand, textualists generally have not sought to use canons
based upon broader social principles such as social justice or equality 141
Many commentators argue or suggest that Justice Scalia gives
excessive weight to syntactical canons and fails to recogmze that Congress
and ordinary users of the English language seldom use grammar and
dictionary definitions as precisely as he does.142 Justice Stevens has accused
137 See Sunstem, Law and.Administration, supra note 86, at 2106.
131 See generally Sunstem, Law andAdministration, supra note 86, at 2106-07
(proposing interpretive principles for the regulatory state); Sunstem, Interpreting
Statutes, supra note 1, at 462-505 (same), 506-08 (Appendix A listing interpretive
principles for regulatory state). But see Eben Moglen & Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Sunstern's New Canons: Choosing the Fictions of Statutory Interpretation, 57 U.
CHI. L. REv 1203 (1990) (criticizing Sunstem's proposed interpretive principles).
139 See, e.g., Bremmgerv Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 493 U.S. 67, 91-92
& n.15 (1989) (using ejusdem genens canon: context may narrow the meaning of
a term); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414
U.S. 453,458 (1974) (using expressio unius canon: by expressing one thing, statute
excludes others); Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 21, at 663-66; Karkkamen,
supra note 11, at 403-04, 428-30, 445-49 (discussing and criticizing Justice
Scalia's use of grammatical and structural canons to resolve apparent ambiguities
in statutory language); Maggs, supra note 18, at 396; Spence, supra note 37, at
587
141 See Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 21, at 663. But see Karkkanen,
supra note 11, at 450 n.196 (arguing Eskndge's reference to Scalia's use of
"procedural" and "structural" canons often misses the mark, and that Scalia is
really using "clear statement" and other substantive canons); infra notes 419-27 and
accompanying text.
14, See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
142 See Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 21, at 679; Karkkamen, supra
note 11, at 449-50; William D. Popkin, An "Internal" Critique ofJustice Scalia's
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Scalia of reading statutes through "thick grammarian's spectacles."''
Accordingly, his rigid adherence to these canons often leads him to reach
interpretations that are at odds with congressional intent, good policy, or
even common sense.
144
Justice Scalia often uses syntactic canons, sometimes also referred to
as grammatical or structural canons, such as ejusdem genens (general
words following an enumeration are to be construed as being of the same
type or class enumerated) 145 and in pan materia146 (terms used in other
statutes on the same subject will be interpreted as having the same meaning
throughout) to find the "plain" or "ordinary" meaning of a statutory term.147
In some cases, he has revived canons that have been used infrequently by
the Supreme Court in recent years. For instance, in Chan v. Korean Air
Lines, Ltd.,48 Justice Scalia used the canon nclusio unius est exclusio
alternus (the inclusion of one thing implies the exclusion of all others). The
Burger Court during the 1970s and first half of the 1980s rarely employed
this canon except in implied action cases, but Justice Scalia during the late
1980s convinced the Court to Invoke it in a number of cases, 149 and invoked
it himself in dissent.5 Most often he uses syntactical canons to narrow a
statute's possible meaning.1
This Article will examine Justice Scalia's and other textualists'
approach to the substantive canons. Parts I, IV, and V will show that his
approach to the canons reflects underlying values favoring states' rights
and private interests and tends to undervalue certain types of individual
Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REv 1133, 1143 (1992)
[hereinafter Popkin, An "Internal" Critique].
143 West VirginiaUmv. Hosp., Inc. v Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 113 (1991) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
" See Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 21, at 679; Karkkamen, supra
note 11, at 449-50; Popkin, An "Internal" Critique, supra note 142, at 1143.
141 See Arcadia v Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73, 78 (1991) (using ejusdem
generis canon to narrowly construe phrase "or any other subject matter" in § 318
of Federal Power Act); supra note 89 and accompanying text.
146 See Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 706 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
147 See Karkkainen, supra note 11, at 445-50; supra notes 51-59 and accom-
panying text.
148 Chan v Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122 (1989).
149 See, e.g., Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 21, at 664.
5o See Pauley, 501 U.S. at 706 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
"' See Karkkamen, supra note 11, at 445-50; supra notes 139-44 and accom-
panying text.
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liberties, congressional authority, and, surprisingly, even executive auth-
ority
1H1. TEXTUALISTS FAVOR CLEAR-STATEMENT CANONS
Justice Scalia and other modem textualists often use "clear-statement
canons" that require express congressional authorization for a particular
type of government regulatory action; this results m narrow constructions
of a statute. 52 Clear-statement principles are specific applications of the
common law's traditional presumption m favor of narrowly construing
statutes that arguably change the law 15 Most scholars believe that clear-
statement principles generally tend to narrow the scope of statutory
language.1
5 4
While otherjudges also use clear-statement rules, textualistjudges tend
to apply these principles more narrowly because of their greater focus on
the text of the statute compared to judges who also examine legislative
intent.15 In Landgraf v. USI Film Products,"6 Justice Stevens in his
majority opinion discussed the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 before holding that certain provisions of that Act do not apply
'12 See United States v R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 307 (1992) (declaring that one
should not construe a textually ambiguous statute against a criminal defendant
based on legislative history) (Scalia, J., concurring m part and concurring in the
judgment); Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258,286-90
(1992) (presuming common law pnnciples apply unless Congress makes a clear
statement that it intends to override them) (Scalia, J., concurring); United States v
Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30,33-34 (1992) (declaring thatwaiver of sovereign
immunity in bankruptcy statute must be unequivocally expressed in statute); Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 841 (1990) (stating that
unless statutes specifically indicate otherwise, they should be applied
prospectively) (Scalia, J., concurring); Karkkainen, supra note 11, at 450-54.
153 See RUPERT CROSS, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 169-72 (John Bell &
George Engle eds., Butterworth & Co. Ltd. 2d ed. 1987) (1976); Posner, supra note
100, at 811, 821-22; see generally Holmes, 503 U.S. at 286-90 (stating common
law principles are presumed unless Congress makes clear statement it intends to
ovemde them) (Scalia, J., concurring).
154 See CROSS, supra note 153, at 169-72; Karkkamen, supra note 11, at452-53;
Posner, supra note 100, at 811, 821-22.
" See Bernard W Bell, Using Statutory Interpretation to Improve the
Legislative Process: Can ItBeDone in thePost-Chevron Era?, 13 J.L. &POL. 105,
136 n.162 (1997).
156 Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
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retroactively 157 Justice Scalia, however, in a concurring opmionjomed by
his fellow textualists Justices Kennedy and Thomas, objected to the
majority's use of legislative history and argued that only an express
provision in a statute can satisfy the clear-statement principle and allow
Congress to override the court-created presumption against retroactive
application.'58 Professors Eskridge and Frickey have distinguishedbetween
a clear-statement approach that is willing to consider evidence of legisla-
tive intent outside the statutory text, such as legislative history, and to
consider indications of congressional intent in a text that are less than
absolutely clear, and what they consider the more questionable "super-
strong" clear-statement rules that can only be satisfied by a specific
statement in the statutory text.159
Textualist judges often have invoked clear-statement rules to limit
federal statutes that restrict state autonomy or regulate private interests.
160
While other justices have employed federalist canons based upon the
nation's federal system of government, textualists have so frequently
employed principles like federal subject matter jurisdiction,' 6 ' the
constitutional principles of intergovernmental immunity,'62 and the
Eleventh Amendment's rule of state immunity 63 that they have trans-
formed the federalist canon.164
A. Clear-Statement Rules and State Sovereign Immunity
During the early and middle 1980s, before Justice Scalia became a
member, the Court had begun to apply clear-statement rules to protect
1 See id. at 262-63 (1994); Bell, supra note 155, at 136 n.162.
'
58 See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 287-88 (Scalia, J., concurng); Bell, supra note
155, at 136 n.162.
'59 See Eskridge & Fnckey, Quasi-Constitutional Clear Statement Rules, supra
note 132, at 597
160 See supra notes 152, 158-59 and accompanying text; infra notes 161-64,
209-13, 239-59 and accompanying text.
161SeeFinleyv United States, 490 U.S. 545,547-48 (1989) (restricting pendent
and ancillary jurisdiction based on the canon that federal courts have strictly
limited jurisdiction).
162 See Davis v Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 813-15 (1989)
(finding plain meaning of statute partly based on constitutional principles of
intergovernmental immunity law).
163 See Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989) (holding that Education of the
Handicapped Act of 1975 did not abrogate state immunity from lawsuits despite
imposing explicit substantive obligations on states and despite legislative history
to contrary).
164 See, e.g., Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 21, at 665-66.
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states' rights and promote federalist values by requiring Congress to be
explicit in imposing financial or legal burdens on states. In 1981, in
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,'65 the Court used a clear-
statement approach to conclude that a statute disbursing federal financial
assistance to states to care for the developmentally disabled, which
included a bill of rights stating that people with mental disabilities have a
"right" to "appropriate treatment" in the "least restrictive" surroundings,
did not create enforceable rights against participating states."66 In 1985, in
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, Justice Powell's majority opinion
strengthened the clear-statement approach by concluding that the principles
of state sovereign immunity in the Eleventh Amendment require courts to
be certain of congressional intent by imposing a rule that "Congress may
abrogate the States' constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal
court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the
statute."' 67 In dissent, Justice Brennan argued that this strong clear-
statement rule frustrated congressional intent."6 ' In 1986, Congress
expressed its disagreement with Atascadero by enacting a statute stating:
"A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit
in Federal Court for a violation of. [several statutes protecting people with
disabilities]."1
69
Despite the 1986 statute strongly suggesting Congress did not like
clear-statement rules, during the late 1980s, Justices Scalia and Kennedy
joined other justices to expand the use of clear-statement rules to create a
strong presumption of state immunity under several federal statutes. In
Dellmuth v. Muth, 70 Justice Kennedy's five-justice majority opinion held
that the Education of the Handicapped Act of 1975'7' did not abrogate state
immunity from lawsuits despite the statute's broad jurisdiction, the
applicability of the 1986 statute quoted above, and strong legislative history
indicating Congress intended to abrogate state immunity 1, In a brief
165 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
166 See id. at 17; The Developmentally Disabled Assistance Act and Bill of
Rights Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6083 (1994), Pub. L. No. 94-103, 89 Stat.
486 (1975); accord Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 190 n.11 (1982).
67 See Atascadero State Hosp. v Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985); accord
Hoffiman v Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96 (1989).
618 See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 254 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
169 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) (1994); see also Eskndge & Fnckey, Quasi-
Constitutional Clear Statement Rules, supra note 132, at 639.
170 Dellmuth v Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989).
' 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1994).
' 2See Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 223 (holding that Education of the Handicapped
Act of 1975 did not abrogate state immunity from lawsuits despite imposing
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concurring opinion, Justice Scalia observed that the Court's decision did
not preclude Congress from enacting a statute that clearly abrogated state
sovereign immunity "though without explicit reference to state sovereign
immunity or the Eleventh Amendment."'7 3 In dissent, Justice Brennan,
joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, argued that the
statute's text and legislative history met even the rigorous clear-statement
rule enunciated in Atascadero and that Congress m 1986 had expressed its
dissatisfaction with Atascadero by enacting corrective legislation that the
majority blatantly disregarded. 74 Just one year later, Congress overrode
Dellmuth by enacting more specific legislation. 7
Justice Scalia would argue that it is appropriate for the Court to force
Congress to express its intent to abrogate state immunity, but Justice
Stevens would contend that the textualist interpretation wastes the Court's
and Congress' time by ignoring strong legislative history that ought to
satisfy a reasonable clear-statement rule and forces Congress to pass
corrective legislation.176 While there is a place for clear-statement rules to
protect underenforced constitutional norms, including federalism and state
sovereignty, Dellmuth illustrates how judges can selectively use clear-
statement rules to protect certain values, such as states' rights, but that they
do not always apply them to protect individual liberties, as Part IV will
demonstrate.
During the late 1980s, some Supreme Court decisions found a statute
to clearly waive state sovereign immunity to lawsuits. In Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co.,77 Justice Brennan's plurality opinion held that Congress
has the authority under the Commerce Clause to enact a statute permitting
suit for money damages in federal court if a statute expressly makes a state
liable for damages. The court then found that the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthonzation Act of 1986 ("SARA") 7 8 amended the Comprehensive
explicit substantive obligations on states and legislative history to contrary);
Eskndge, New Textualism, supra note 21, at 666.
73 Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 233 (Scalia, J., concurng).
'74 See id. at 233-42 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"75 See 20 U.S.C. § 1403(a) (1994); H. REP NO. 101-544, at 12 (1990), re-
prntedin 1990U.S.C.C.A.N. 1723, 1734 (stating "[t]he Committee has determined
that the Supreme Court [in Dellmuth] misinterpreted Congressional intent");
Eskndge & Fnckey, Quasi-Constitutional Clear Statement Rules, supra note 132,
at 639
176 See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
177 Pennsylvania v Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
171 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-499,
100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
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Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980
("CERCLA")' 79 to clearly create that state liability 180 In his concurring
opimon, Justice White, joined in part by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, applied a strong clear-statement approach
to conclude that there was no clear language in CERCLA or SARA
expressing Congress' intent to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity 181 Despite this, Justice White, in a separate portion of his
concurring opinion joined by no other justices, used an intentionalist
approach and agreed with the plurality's conclusion that Congress has the
authority under Article I to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment
nnmunity 182 Interestingly, in an opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part, Justice Scalia agreed with Justice Brennan that CERCLA and
SARA, when read together, render states liable for money damages in
private suits because the text clearly allows them, even if Justice White was
correct that the subjective intent of the enacting Congress in 1980 or 1986
was to retain state immunity 183 Accordingly, Justice Scalia's textualist
approach in this case, including his use of a clear-statement rule, read the
statute more broadly against state immunity than Justice White's
mtentionalist approach. Nevertheless, Justice Scalia,jomed mpartby Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, then argued that
Congress did not have authority under the Commerce Clause to abrogate
state immunity '84Notably, despite his strong commitment to states' rights,
Justice Scalia's textualism sometimes leads him to surprising results,
including his conclusion that CERCLA and SARA meet his clear-statement
test. However, on the whole, Justice White's conclusion, joined by three
other justices, including Justice Kennedy, a moderate textualist, that
CERCLA and SARA do not clearly waive state immunity is more typical
of how clear-statement rules work.
More recent cases have continued to protect state sovereignty against
federal encroachment. In Gregory v. Ashcroft,' 5 Justice O'Connor's
majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, and Souter, applied a new clear-statement rule to statutes that
179 CERCLA §§ 101(20)(D), (21), 107(a), (d)(2), (g), 120(a)(1), 310(a)(1), 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601(20)(D), (21), 9607(a), (d)(2), (g), 9620(a)(1), 9659(a)(1) (1994).
'80 See Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 7-22.
181 See id. at 45-56 (White, J., concumng).
'82 See itd. at 56-57 (White, J., concumng).
'13 See id. at 29-30 (Scalia, J., concumng in part and dissenting in part).
184 See id. at 31-42 (Scalia, J., concumng in part and dissenting in part).
185 Gregory v Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
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attempt to regulate "core" state functions and held that the federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act" 6 did not apply to appointed state
judges. What is remarkable about her opinion is that the Court could have
concluded that appointed judges fall within the statute's exception for
"appointee[s] on the policymakmg level."'8 7 Instead, Justice O'Connor
created a super-strong clear-statement rule for federal regulation of "core"
state functions. "[I]nasmuch as this Court in Garcia has left primarily to
the political process the protection of the States against intrusive exercises
of Congress's Commerce Clause powers, we must be absolutely certain
that Congress intended such an exercise."'88 Her opinion argued that
Congress' authority under the Supremacy Clause to preempt state law "in
areas traditionally regulated by the States" is "an extraordinary power in a
federalist system" that "we must assume Congress does not exercise
lightly "s189
While there is a case for using clear-statement rules to protect state
sovereignty against federal encroachment, Gregory illustrates the problems
with applying federalist canons or clear-statement rules. Gregory provides
little direction for when courts should apply a clear-statement rule to
prevent a federal statute from impairing "areas traditionally regulated by
the States,"' 90 state actions of "the most fundamental sort for a sovereign
entity,"' 91 or state authority that lies at "'the heart of representative
government.""'92 The same day it decided Gregory, the Court in Chisom v
Roemer'9i held that section 2 of the Voting Rights Act'94 applied to the
election of state judges without requiring a clear statement from Congress,
which indirectly undercuts Gregory's clear-statement protection of state
judges. In his dissenting opinion in Roemer, Justice Scalia suggested that
Gregory's clear-statement principle potentially was applicable, which
demonstrates his commitment to using such rules to protect state sover-
eignty, but even he acknowledged that Gregory might be distinguishable
because Roemer clearly involved congressional authority under the
116 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
187 Id. § 630(f); see also Eskndge & Fnckey, Quasi-Constitutional Clear
Statement Rules, supra note 132, at 623-24.
1I Gregory, 501 U.S. at 464 (emphasis added) (citing Garcia v San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)).
189 Id. at 460.
1
90 Id.
191 Id.
92 Id. at 462 (quoting Sugannan v Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973)).
193 Chisom v Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
194 2 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
[VOL. 86
1997-98] SELECTIVE CANONS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 557
Fourteenth Amendment and m Gregory it was unclear whether that
Amendment or the commerce power was at issue.'95 Even ifRoemer m fact
was distinguishable, Gregory and other clear-statement cases protecting
state sovereignty place significant burdens on congressional lawmaking
without articulating a clear theory of the types of state functions that
deserve such protection.
19 6
During the last few years the Supreme Court, in a number of different
decisions, has emphasized the importance of protecting states' rights
against national power. While not directly implicating the use of clear-
statement rules, these cases suggest that the Court is likely to continue to
use clear-statement principles to narrow federal statutes and protect state
interests. In 1992, in New York v. United States,197 Justice O'Connor's
majority opinion, which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas joined in its entirety, held that Congress
cannot "commandeer" the regulatory authority of state legislatures. 98 In
1995, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in United States v.
Lopez,9 9 which was joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas, struck down the Federal Gun-Free School Zones Act, which
prohibited possession of a gun near a school, because the statute exceeded
Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause. Lopez emphasized,
"Under our federal system, the 'States possess primary authority for
defining and enforcing the criminal law "200 In 1996, in Seminole Tribe v
Florida,"' Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas,
Kennedy, and O'Connor, concluded that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
clearly intended to abrogate states' sovereign immunity, 2 but overruled
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. 213 and held that Congress did not have
'95 See Chisom, 501 U.S. at 411-12 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Eskridge & Fnckey,
Quasi-Constitutional Clear Statement Rules, supra note 132, at 633-34.
196 See Eskndge & Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Clear StatementRules, supra
note 132, at 633-34.
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
'
98 See id. at 176. Justice White filed an opinion concumng in part and dissent-
ing in part, in which Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined. See id. at 188-210
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens also filed an
opinion concumng in part and dissenting m part. See id. at 210-13 (Stevens, J.,
concurrmng m part and dissenting in part).
19 United States v Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
2°Id. at 561 n.3 (quoting Brecht v Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993)).
201 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
212Seeid. at 1119.
203Pennsylvania v Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
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authority under the Commerce Clause to abrogate states' sovereign
immunity 2 4 In 1997, in Prntz v. United States,"' the same five-justice
majority, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, invoked the principles of dual
federal/state sovereignty espoused m Gregory to hold that Congress'
attempt in the Brady Act 0 6 to force local law enforcement officials to
conduct background checks on gun purchasers violates the Constitution's
protection of state sovereignty 
207
It is notable that the three textualist judges on the Court, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas, were in the majority m Lopez, New York, Seminole
Tribe, and Printz. While there is not a direct connection between a
textualist approach to statutory interpretation and support for states' rights,
an examination of the voting patterns in those four cases, as well as
Gregory, suggests that five justices (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas) who favor states' rights in
general also find clear-statement rules that protect state sovereign
immunity to be attractive. Justice Souter, however, supported a clear-
statement approach in Gregory and voted with the majority in New York,
but his subsequent dissenting votes in Lopez, Seminole Tribe, and Prntz
suggest he is far less committed to states' rights. Because clear-statement
rules for state immunity or lenity for state and local officials operate to
advance these federalist views, the Court is likely to continue to invoke
them, even if a statute's purpose or legislative history is relatively clear,
and to force Congress to go through the time-consuming process of
amending statutes to unequivocally state its views. Even if Congress
unequivocally expresses its views, however, New York, Lopez, Seminole
Tribe, and Printz all place constitutional limits on Congress' ability to
regulate state governments.
B. Federal Sovereign Immunity
Beginning in the early 1990s, Justice Scalia and other textualist judges
began encouraging their colleagues to use clear-statement rules to expand
federal sovereign immunity. Again, Justice Stevens, oftenjoinedby Justice
Blackmun, has consistently voted against applying clear-statement rules to
expand federal sovereign immunity, both because he believes that
204 See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1125-32.
205 Pnntz v United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
206The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1)(A)(i)
(0), (SIV, (s)(1)(A)(ii) (1994).217 See Prmntz, 117 S. Ct. at 2376-78.
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sovereign immunity is anachronistic and because of his nontextualist
approach to statutory interpretation.2 8 In United States v Nordic Village,
Inc.,209 Justice Scalia expanded cases protecting state sovereignty to create
a strong clear-statement rule against federal statutory waivers of the United
States' own sovereign immunity in a decision involving the federal
bankruptcy code.21 Justice Scalia applied a super-strong clear-statement
approach that required an unequivocal waiver of federal sovereign
immunity m the text of section 106(c) of the Bankruptcy Code,21' and
refused to consider contrary evidence in the statute's legislative history 
212
In dissent, Justice Stevens criticized the majority's reading of the statute's
text, especially its refusal to consider legislative history 
213
Similarly, in Ardestani v. 7!NS,214 which was decided one year before
Nordic Village, Justice O'Connor's opinion declared that the "plain
language of the [Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA")], coupled with the
strict construction of waivers of sovereign immunity,"2 5 forced the Court
to conclude that an Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS")
deportation hearing is not an adjudication under section 554 of the
Administrative Procedure Act, and, accordingly, that such a hearing was
not an "adversary adjudication" under the EAJA in which a prevailing
party was entitled to attorneys' fees and expenses. 26 In dissent, Justice
Blackmun, joined by Justice Stevens, disagreed with the majority's
characterization of the statutory language as unambiguous, and especially
objected to the Court's refusal to consider the statute's purpose.2 7
In United States Department ofEnergy v Oho,2 8 the Court in a six-to-
three decision held that none of the provisions of the Clean Water Act or
118 See JohnPaul Stevens, Is Justice lrrelevant?, 87NW U.L.REv 1121(1993)
(arguing that sovereign unmunity does not serve contemporary social needs); John
CopelandNagle, Waiving Sovereign Immunity in an Age of Clear Statement Rules,
1995 WIS. L. REV 771,774 n.22 (citing seven cases in which Justice Stevens voted
against federal sovereign immunity and four in which Justice Blackmun did so).
209United States v Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992).
See id. at 34 (using clear-statement principle to narrow bankruptcy statute
and avoid abrogating federal sovereign immunity).
211 11 U.S.C. § 106(c) (1994).
212 See Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. at 34-37
213 See id. at 40-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
214 Ardestam v INS, 502 U.S. 129 (1991).
215 Id. at 138.
26 See id. at 134-38; 5 U.S.C. §§ 504(a)(1), 504(b)(1)(C)(i) (1994).
217 SeeArdestani, 502 U.S. at 139-50 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
211 United States Dep't of Energy v Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992).
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Resource Conservation Recovery Act ("RCRA") waive the sovereign
immunity of federal agencies from civil penalties for violations of state or
federal pollution laws." 9 Section 313(a) of the Clean Water Act makes the
United States liable for "sanctions" under federal, state, and local law to the
same extent as any nongovernmental entity,2 0 and section 6001 of the
RCRA makes the federal government subject to "all Federal, State,
interstate, and local requirements."' However, the Court concluded m
each instance that these terms applied only to "coercive" penalties for
violating a prospective judicial or agency order, and not to "punitive fines"
for past conduct violating a statutory or regulatory requirement.
tZ
Section 313(a) of the Clean Water Act also states that "the United
States shall be liable only for those civil penalties arising under Federal law
or imposed by a state or local court to enforce an order or the process of
such court.' 223 Ohio contended that a civil penalty imposed for violation of
a state law permit program approved by the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") is one "arising under Federal law" as defined by section
313(a), but the Court held that a fine for violating a state statute, even one
approved by a federal agency, is not a fine "arising under Federal law "
The Court recognized that it was possible to read the language "arising
under Federal law" expansively to include state statutes approved by
federal agencies, but it relied on the canon that statutes waiving sovereign
immunity must be construed narrowly, and, therefore, that ambiguous
statutory language may not effectuate a waiver.22 By invoking a clear-
statement canon to avoid waiving sovereign immunity, however, the Court
selectively ignored the contrary canon that statutes should be read to avoid
rendering any language superfluous.226 In the dissent, Justice White,joined
by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, argued both statutes waived sovereign
immunity, and, in particular, maintained that the civil penalties arose under
federal law as defined by section 313(a) of the Clean Water Act. 27
219 See id. at 611.
220 See 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1994).
221 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1994).
2 See Ohio, 503 U.S. at 623, 627-28.
223 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a).
224 Ohio, 503 U.S. at 623.
' See id. at 625-26; Nagle, supra note 208, at 786.
226 See Ratzlaf v United States, 510 U.S. 135, 140 (1994) (invoking canon
against making any statutory terms superfluous); see also Nagle, supra note 208,
at 786.
17 See Ohio, 503 U.S. at 630-36 (White, J., dissenting).
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Four months after the Supreme Court decided Ohio, Congress amended
the RCRA to explicitly waive the federal government's sovereign
immunity from civil penalties for violating state hazardous waste statutes,
regulations, or orders.228 The conference committee report and individual
members of Congress stated that they intended to reverse Ohio, and that the
decision's refusal to waive sovereign immunity was inconsistent with
Congress' intent in enacting section 6001.229 Congress, however, failed to
amend the Clean Water Act despite the introduction of several proposed
bills that would have waived federal sovereign immunity for civil penalties.
Tins is largely attributed to the legislative mability to agree on other,
unrelated, proposed amendments to that Act." °
Taken together, Ardestani, Nordic Village, and Ohio require that
Congress use clear statutory language to waive sovereign immunity
because the Court will not consider a statute's purpose, legislative history,
or arguably ambiguous language?31 While Justices O'Connor, Souter, and
Rehnquist are not new textualists in the same sense as Justices Scalia,
Thomas, or even Kennedy, they have helped to create a largely textualist
clear-statement approach to waiving sovereign immunity
In 1995, however, the Court in an opinion in which Justice Scalia
concurred appeared to limit its clear-statement approach to federal
sovereign immunity 12 In Williams v. United States, 3 the Court held in a
six-to-three opinion that a divorced woman had standing to protest a tax
lien on a house in which she now held sole title, but which she formerly
had owned jointly with her ex-spouse, although the Internal Revenue
Service ("IRS") had assessed the tax against her former husband.3 In her
majority opinion, Justice Ginsburg began her analysis by applying the
clear-statement rules in Ohio and Nordic Village: "[W]e may not enlarge
the waiver beyond the purview of the statutory language," and "[O]ur task
is to discern the 'unequivocally expressed' intent of Congress, construing
ambiguities in favor of immunity "1 Section 1346(a)(1) of Title 28 of the
228 See Federal Facility Compliance Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-386, §
102(a)(3), 106 Stat. 1505 (1992) (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1994)).
229 See 138 CONG. REC. H8864 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1992); Nagle, supra note
208, at 825 n.262.
2"o See Nagle, supra note 208, at 825 n.263 (citing proposed legislation).
23' See id. at 787
232 See id. at 794-96.
233 United States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527 (1995).
234 See id.
235 Id. at 531 (quoting United States v Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33
(1992)).
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United States Code creates federal jurisdiction over "[a]ny civil action
against the United States for the recovery of any internal revenue tax
alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected.""u6
While there is a general principle that a party may not challenge the tax
liability of another, Justice Ginsburg concluded that § 1346(a)(1) clearly
waived federal sovereign immunity for taxpayers in Williams' situation
because the lien on her house made Williams a taxpayer and subject to any
internal revenue tax.237 While Ginsburg claimed to follow Ohio and Nordic
Village, she applied a purposive approach at odds with the formal textualist
approach of those earlier cases. She argued that adopting the IRS' reading
of the Code would deny taxpayers in Williams' situation any practical
relief, which was at odds with the Court's "preference for common sense
mquiries over formalism.
2 38
Remarkably, Justice Scalia, the author of Nordic Village, filed a
concurring opinion that largely agreed with Justice Ginsburg's opinion.3
While the clear-statement rule for waivers of sovereign immunity applies
to the question of how broadly a court should read the scope of such a
waiver, Justice Scalia argued that a clear-statement approach did not
"require explicit waivers to be given a meaning that is implausible,"24 and,
quoting Justice Cardozo, maintained that " '[t]he exemption of the
sovereign from suit involves hardship enough where consent has been
withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by refinement of construction where
consent has been announced." ',241
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by his textualist colleagues Justices
Kennedy and Thomas, persuasively argued that the majority's approach to
waiving sovereign immunity was "an unusual departure from the bedrock
principle that waivers of sovereign immunity must be 'unequivocally
expressed,"' and was thus mconsistent with recent cases such as Nordic
Village and Ohio.242 While acknowledging that some provisions of the
Code suggestedthat Williams shouldhave standing, Rehnquist agreedwith
23628 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1994).
237 See Williams, 514 U.S. at 539-41.
238 See id. at 1618-20; Nagle, supra note 208, at 795.
'9 See Williams, 514 U.S. at 541 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia, how-
ever, found it unnecessary to decide whether Williams was a "taxpayer" under the
Code. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring); Nagle, supra note 208, at 795.
240 Williams, 514 U.S. at 541 (Scalia, J., concurnng).
24 Id. (quoting United States v Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366,383
(1949) (quoting Anderson v John L. Hayes Constr. Co., 153 N.E. 28,29-30 (N.Y
1926) (Cardozo, J.))).
242Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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the government that the Code's administrative exhaustion provisions
defined "taxpayer" narrowly to include only one actually liable for a tax,
and that these provisions were enough to show that Congress had not
unequivocally waived federal sovereign immunity because courts construe
ambiguous statutes as not waiving immunity 243
In 1996, in Lane v. Pena,2' Justice O'Connor's seven-justice majority
opinion applied a clear-statement approach and stated that a statute's
legislative history cannot supply a waiver of federal sovereign immunity
that does not appear clearly in any statutory text.245 She emphasized that
Congress must unequivocally express its intent to waive federal sovereign
immunity in a statute's text.246 The Court then reaffirmed the approach to
clear-statement rules of Ohio and Nordic Village. Accordingly, the Court
held that Congress had not waived the federal government's sovereign
Immunity against awards of monetary damages for violations of section
504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,247 which prohibits, among other
things, discrimination on the basis of disability "under any program or
activity conducted by any Executive agency 
248
While the Supreme Court has not been as explicit about invoking a
clear-statement rule in deciding waivers of federal sovereign immunity as
it has with state sovereign immunity, Ardestani s refusal to consider a
statute's purpose in deciding whether to waive sovereign immunity, Nordic
Village's rejection of legislative history as a factor, and Ohio "s principle
that an ambiguous statute may not waive immunity effectively created a
clear-statement rule for federal sovereign immunity, although admittedly,
Williams has created some doubts.249 It is likely that the pervasive use of
clear-statement rules in cases involving state sovereign immunity has had
some impact when judges have addressed its cousin, federal sovereign
immunty An interesting question is whether Williams signals a more
pragmatic approach to textualism by Justice Scalia, reflects his lesser
commitment to federal sovereign immunity than state immunity or,
perhaps, reflects a reaction against the IRS in general or the specific facts
14 3 See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (discussing 26 U.S.C. §§ 6511 (a) (1994)
(providing administrative claims "shall be filed by the taxpayer"), 7422 (requiring
administrative exhaustion prior to suit), 770 1(a)(14) (defining "taxpayer" as "any
person subject to any internal revenue tax")); Nagle, supra note 208, at 795-96.
244 Lane v. Pena, 116 S. Ct. 2092 (1996).
245 See id. at 2096-97
246 See id.
247 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
48 See Lane, 116 S. Ct. at 2097-2100; 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
249See Nagle, supra note 208, at 796-98.
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of that case. Lane indicates that the Court remains committed to the use of
clear-statement rules in determining whether to waive federal sovereign
immunity. It is important to observe that textualistjudges may show certain
intellectual tendencies, such as using clear-statement rules to read statutes
narrowly, but they are hardly machines and sometimes reach unexpected
decisions in individual cases. The fact that Justices Thomas and Kennedy
dissented in Williams probably is reflective more oftextualism's preference
for clear-statement rules than is Justice Scalia's unexpectedly pragmatic
concurrence in that case.
C. Clear Statements and Private Businesses
Textualist judges also have favored clear-statement rules to limit
statutes regulating private businesses. In several concurring opinions,
Justice Scalia has sought to encourage the Court to transform traditional
canons limiting government regulation into stronger clear-statement rules.
In Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno,5 ° Justice Scalia
argued that statutes should be construed to apply only prospectively unless
there is a clear statement to the contrary 25 1 Similarly, in Landgrafv. USI
Film Products,2 52 Justice Scalia's concurring opinion took an existing
canon against retroactive application of statutes and helped to transform
that principle into a harder clear-statement rule. 53 In Holmes v. Securities
Investor Protection Corp.,54 Justice Scalia's concurring opinion sought to
create a new clear-statement principle that Congress intends to apply
common law concepts such as "proximate cause" and "zone-of-interest"
tests unless it clearly states otherwise. Accordingly, the Court should read
the jurisdiction of the federal civil RICO statute25 narrowly to exclude
claims in which a plaintiff cannot satisfy traditional common law proxi-
mate cause and zone-of-interest requirements. 6
Clear-statement principles often are valuable in preserving certain
under-enforced constitutional norms, such as federalism. 7 There is a
z0Kaiser Alummum & Chem. Corp. v Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827 (1990).
'sSee id. at 841 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that statute should be construed
prospectively unless it contains clear statement to contrary).
12 Landgrafv USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
z See id. at 287-88 (Scalia, J., concurring); Bell, supra note 155, at 136.
H41Holmes v Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992).
21 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994).
2S6 See id. at 287-88 (stating that common law principles are presumed unless
Congress makes clear statement it intends to override them) (Scalia, J., concurnng);
Karkkamen, supra note 11, at 450-51.
"'7 See Eskridge & Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Clear StatementRules, supra
note 132, at 597
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danger, however, that when clear-statement rules are applied too rigorously
they will undermine Congress' purpose in enacting a statute. That problem
is intensified if ajudge ignores other traditional canons that tend to enlarge
statutory meaning. Justice Scalia has derided as "meaningless" the canon
that remedial statutes are to be construed liberally to achieve their purpose,
because there are no accepted criteria by which to judge whether a statute
is remedial.Y18 As a result, Justice Scalia's version of textualism is biased
m favor of narrow statutory interpretations that may not reflect congressio-
nal intent and that often defeat maj oritarian expectations by imposing clear-
statement rules that the enacting Congress did not expect. 9 While
Congress m theory can override clear-statement rules by enacting more
specific statutes, the political difficulties of enacting such legislation are
formidable. This is true even when a majority of Congress would prefer to
do so, because powerful interest groups, a presidential veto, or sheer inertia
in Congress may obstruct override efforts.260
IV TEXTUALISM AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
Justice Scalia and his fellow textualists sometimes use the canons of
construction, such as the principle of narrowly construing criminal statutes
if there are two possible meanings, to protect individual rights. However,
they are more likely to apply this canon when it serves other principles that
they value, such as states' rights. Similarly, textualists sometimes invoke
the canon of avoiding serious constitutional questions, yet failed to invoke
it in a case involving the highly charged issue of abortion.
A. The Rule ofLenity
Justice Scalia sometimes uses the "rule of lenity" to narrowly construe
a penal statute that has more than one possible meaning.26' He is more
" See Antonim Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40
CASEW. RES. L. REV 581 (1989).
" See Bell, supra note 155, at 136 n.162; Eskridge & Fnckey, Quasi-Con-
stitutional Clear Statement Rules, supra note 132, at 636-40; Karkkanen, supra
note 11, at 450-54; supra notes 71-74, 173-76 and accompanying text.
2" See Eskndge & Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Clear Statement Rules, supra
note 132, at 639-40.
261 See, e.g., United States v. RLC, 503 U.S. 291, 307 (1992) (Scalia, J., con-
curring m part and concurring in the judgment); see also Smith v. United States,
508 U.S. 223, 246-47 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (using rule of lenity as
secondary argument). But cf. Deal v United States, 508 U.S. 129, 141 (1993)
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likely, however, to apply the rule of lenity to protect state or local officials
from federal prosecution, which reflects his sympathy for local sovereignty
against federal control. In McNally v. United States,262 the Court ma seven-
person majority opinion written by Justice White held that the federal mail
fraud statute 63 did not apply to a state official who assigned state insurance
business to certain agencies that were required to "kick back" part of the
insurance premiums. The majority interpreted the statute, using the rule of
lenity, to apply only to fraud involving money or property rights, and the
federal prosecutor failed to prove monetary loss to the state. The Court
refused to read the statute broadly because, it said, courts should avoid
involving "the Federal Government in setting standards of disclosure and
good government for local and state officials"unless "Congress has spoken
in clear and definite language."26 Justice Stevens, joined in all but a tiny
portion of his dissenting opinion by Justice O'Connor, argued that
numerous Supreme Court and lower court decisions over a long period had
endorsed a broad reading of the mail fraud statute, and that Congress had
at least implicitly endorsed this broad reading. 65
As part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, however, Congress
rejected McNally by adding the following section to the mail and wire
fraud statutes: "For the purposes of this chapter, the term 'scheme or
artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to defraud another of the
intangible right of honest services. 2 66 While the statute does not specify
that the term "honest services" applies to government officials, the limited
legislative history addressing this issue suggests that Congress intended to
cnminalize misconduct by public officials. 67 In 1996, a divided panel of
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied a clear-statement
approach to conclude the term "honest services" did not apply to state
government officials who were convicted of depriving citizens of their
(finding, in majority opinion by Justice Scalia, that statute has "plain meaning"
despite Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion invoking rule of lenity).262 McNally v United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
263 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).
264 McNally, 483 U.S. at 359-60.
265 See id. at 362-77 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
266 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603(a), 102 Stat.
4508 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1994)).267 See George D. Brown, Should Federalism Shield Corruption? -Mail Fraud,
State Law and Post-Lopez Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REV 225, 231 n.47 (1997);
Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and Intangible Rights Doctrine: Someone to
Watch Over Us, 31 HARv J. ON LEGIS. 153, 169 (1994).
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right to good and faithful service because they accepted "loans" from
attorneys with cases before their state agency 261 On rehearing, however,
the circuit m a fourteen-to-three en banc decision affirmed their convic-
tions, holding that "honest services" did refer to services they owed to their
state employer under state law 269
Despite Congress' apparent rejection of McNally's clear-statement
approach to applying federal criminal statutes to state officials, in
McConnzckv. United States ,271 Justice White's majority opinion applied a
similar approach. The Court read the Hobbs Act 271 narrowly, using the rule
of lenity, to avoid federal prosecutorial involvement in state political
processes, and, specifically, the ability of public officials to solicit and
accept campaign contributions.2 In McCormick, a lobbyist did not list as
campaign contributors or report as income for federal tax purposes a series
of cash payments to a state legislator, who had complained to the lobbyist
about his need for additional money for hs election campaign. The
legislator was reelected and sponsored more legislation favorable to
interests represented by the lobbyist.2" Emphasizing the role that political
contributions play in American electoral politics, the Court narrowed the
statute by adding a quid pro quo requirement applicable only to prosecu-
tions of elected public officials accused of extorting campaign funds.274
Accordingly, an elected public official extorts campaign contributions in
violation of the Hobbs Act only where the official explicitly represents that
the terms of her promise will control her official conduct. 5
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia reluctantly agreed with the
majority's reasoning because of the "assumptions on wich this case was
briefed and argued," but suggested that the text of the statute required an
even narrower definition of when elected officials may commit extortion
under the Hobbs Act. 6 Observing that the text of the statute "contains not
even a colorable allusion to campaign contributions or quid pro quos,"
Scalia suggested that the phrase "receipt of money under color of official
26 See United States v Brumley, 79 F.3d 1430 (5th Cir. 1996) (2-1 decision).
269See United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 625 (1997).270 McCormick v United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991).
271 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994).
272 See McCormick, 500 U.S. at 271-74.
273 See id. at 259-60.
274 id. at 268-74.
275 id. at 273.
276Id. at 276-80 (Scalia, J., concumng).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
right" does not mean extortion paid on account of one's office, as courts
have traditionally interpreted this and similar language. 7 Rather, Scalia
suggested that the phrase applies only to money paid under a false clann of
right; however, he was careful not to decide the issue.278 Under Scalia's
suggested false pretenses rule, a public official would be liable under the
Hobbs Act only if she wrongfully asserted her entitlement to the money for
the performance of official acts. Therefore, his approach would allow most
accused officials to escape conviction if they had acknowledged to the
contributor that they were not entitled to the payoff for the exercise of
public duties. 9
In 1992, in Evans v. United States,280 Justice Stevens, who had
dissented in McCormick, wrote a majority opinion that relied heavily on
common law extortion cases to conclude that the Hobbs Act did not require
the government to prove that a public official had coerced, induced, or
made false statements to someone to obtain a payment. 28' Rather, Stevens
held that a prosecutor "need only show that a public official has obtained
a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was
made in return for official acts. 282
In a long, vitriolic dissentjomedby Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia, Justice Thomas, during his first term on the Court, argued that the
statute required the government to prove a public official induced the
payment, and, furthermore, that the official had received it under a pretense
of entitlement.283 Thomas took issue with the majority's historical account
of the common law definition of extortion,284 and also argued that the
majority failed to apply the rule of lenity and instead adopted the harshest
possible interpretation of a criminal statute.285 Furthermore, Thomas argued
277 Id. (Scalia, J., concurrng).
278 See id. (Scalia, J., concurring); James Lindgren, The Theory, History, and
Practice of the Bribery-Extortion Distinction, 141 U. PA. L. REV 1695, 1711-12
(1993).
279 See Eric DavidWeissman, Note, McCormickv. United States: The QuidPro
Quo Requirement in Hobbs Act Extortion Under Color of Offictal Right, 42 CATH.
U. L. REv 433, 463-64 (1993).
280 Evans v United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992).
281 See id. at 268.
282Id. (footnote omitted).
283 See Id. at 278-97 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
' See id. at 278-87 (Thomas, J., dissenting). But see id. at 269-71 (arguing that
Thomas's historical analysis of common law extortion cases is seriously flawed);
Lmdgren, supra note 278, at 1720-32, 1739-40 (same).
211 See Evans, 504 U.S. at 287-90 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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that the majority's approach was inconsistent with the "basic tenets of
federalism" because it expanded a federal criminal statute into a "field
traditionally policed by state and local laws - acts of public corruption by
state and local officials.""2 6 Thomas invoked Gregory's clear-statement rule
andMcNally's caution against reading federal criminal statutes too broadly
to compel "good government" by state and local officials, arguing that the
Court should not construe the Hobbs Act to allow federal prosecutors to
interfere with the electoral behavior of state elected officials unless
Congress had explicitly authorized such prosecutions." 7 While Justice
Thomas's dissent is basedpartially on the rule of lenity, federalist concerns
about excessive federal prosecutorial interference with state and local
officials appear to have been an even stronger reason for the harsh tone of
his vigorous dissent.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy rejected the false pretenses
argument m Thomas's dissenting opinion, but argued that the Hobbs Act
did require the government to prove inducement under a quid pro quo
test."' Acknowledging that "the phrase 'under color of official right,'
standing alone, is vague almost to the point of unconstitutionality,"8 9
Justice Kennedy applied the rule of lenity, a state-of-mind requirement, and
the canon that statutes are to be construed so that they are constitutional to
find a quid pro quo requirement. Kennedy rejected Justice Thomas's
argument that because the quid pro quo requirement was not explicitly
contained in the statute, courts must have made it up.29 Thus, Justice
Kennedy applied a more moderate textualism that sought to read the text
in light of the traditional canons of construing statutes, which permitted
him to find a quid pro quo requirement derived from the statutory
language.291
In City of Columbia v. Omm Outdoor Advertising, Inc.,292 a civil case
involving the Sherman Antitrust Act,293 Justice Scalia, in a six-justice
2 Id. at 290 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
'
7 See id. at 291-94 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Gregory v Ashcroft, 501
U.S. 452, 460-61, 467 (1991); McNally v United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359-60
(1987)).
"s See id. at 272-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
' 9 Id. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting United States v Grady, 742
F.2d 682,695 (2d Cir. 1984) (Van Graafeiland, J., concurrng in part and dissenting
m part)).290 See id. at 275-76 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
291 See id. (Kennedy, J., concumng).
22 City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991).
293 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-5 (1994).
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opinion, applied the principle of avoiding federal involvement in local
politics to conclude that public-private conspiracies against competition are
immune from federal antitrust liability 294 In his dissenting opinion in
Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas,295 which was joined by Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter, Justice Scalia would have gone even further by
adopting a presumption against a broad reading of the Sherman Act's
interstate commerce provisions.296
While Justice Scalia has a libertarian streak in some criminal cases, he
and his fellow textualists, Justices Kennedy and Thomas, are especially
likely to invoke the rule of lenity in cases involving federal prosecution of
state and local political officials. Furthermore, Justice Scalia's support for
restrictions on federal habeas corpus suggests that his commitment to
states' rights is usually stronger than his interest in preserving the rights of
criminal defendants.297
B. Title VII and Extraterritoriality
In EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.,298 the Court acknowledged the
power of Congress to enact statutes that apply beyond our nation's
boundaries, but invoked the canon that unless a contrary intent appears,
congressional legislation is meant to apply only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States. Therefore, as a result, it rejected the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission's interpretation that Title VII ofthe
Civil Rights Act applied extraterritonally 29  The Court argued that the
canon avoided international discord by preventing unintended conflicts
between American laws and those of other nations. °0 What is notable is
that the Court transformed an old "presumption" into a new and stronger
"clear-statement rule" that may be rebutted only by clear statutory
language 101 Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion emphasizing that a
294 See Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. at 370-84. Justice Stevens wrote
a dissenting opinion joined by Justices White and Marshall. See id. at 385-99
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
295 Summit Health, Ltd. v Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322 (1991).
296 See id. at 333-34, 343 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
297 See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (holding that consti-
tutional claims presented for the first time in state habeas corpus proceedings are
not subject to federal habeas corpus review).
298 EEOC v Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
299 See id. at 248.
300 See id.
301 See id.
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court could not "give effect to mere implications from the statutory
language" in the face of a clear-statement rule requiring Congress to
"clearly express[ ]" its intent to apply a statute extraterritonally3 02 In
dissent, Justice Marshall argued that the majority's use of a clear-statement
rule thwarted strong evidence that Congress intended for Title VII to apply
to United States citizens working in foreign nations for American
companies.3 03
In Arabian American Oil Co., the Court's reliance on principles of
international comity was misplaced because these problems are usually
insigmficant when American law regulates American compames' treatment
of United States citizens.311 A better explanation is that the Court used a
clear-statement rule to make it more difficult for Congress to regulate
American businesses abroad and to protect disadvantaged groups against
discrimination. 305 Justice Scalia generally has favored placing greater
procedural burdens on Title VII plaintiffs that make it easier for defendants
to defeat disparate impact cases.3" He also rejects affirmative action.
0 7
Thus, Justice Scalia's substantive views about Title VII may well have
influenced his eagerness to impose a clear-statement rule in Arabian
American Oil Co.
C. Avoiding Constitutional Questions: Inconsistent Application
Perhaps the most important of the constitutionally based canons is that
"'[w]hen the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and
even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal
principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.'" 30 During
3 ' Id. at 259-60 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurrng m the judgment);
see also Bell, supra note 155, at 136.
303 SeeArabanAm. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 260-75, 278 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
SSeeEskndge & Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Clear Statement Rules, supra
note 132, at 616.
305 See id. at 616-17
3 6See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atomo, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (requiring
that the plaintiff show that challenged practice has a significantly disparate mipact
on employment opportunities for whites and non-whites to support a prima facie
case).
307 See, e.g., Martin v Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (allowing collateral attacks
on prior consent decrees containing hiring and promotion preferences).
30 International Ass'n Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1961)
(quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22,62 (1932)); see also Eskndge & Frickey,
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the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Burger Court frequently invoked this
super-canon." 9 Since Justice Scaliajomed the Court in 1986, the Court has
been less consistent m applying this canon. Some argue that this canon
gives judges too much discretion to narrowly interpret statutes that do not
actually violate a constitutional principle, so its use should be limited.310
There is a stronger argument, however, that many constitutional norms are
underenforced and this canon allows courts to vindicate constitutional
principles by narrowing questionable but not necessarily invalid statutes.3 '
In Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building &
Construction Trades Council," the National Labor Relations Board issued
an order instructing a union to stop distributing handbills at a shopping
mall. The Board believed that such activity violated a provision of the
National Labor Relations Act 13 making it an unfair labor practice to
"threaten, coerce, or restrain any person" from doing business with
another.3 14 Justice White's opinion for the Court cited Chevron v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.s15 and observed that the NLRB's
interpretation "would normally be entitled to deference unless that
construction were clearly contrary to the intent of Congress."3 16 The Court
did not defer to the Board, however, because "[a]nother rule of statutory
construction is pertinent here: where an otherwise acceptable construc-
tion of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will
construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is
plainly contrary to the intent of Congress."3 17 The Court found that the
Board's interpretation raised serious First Amendment concerns and
Quasi-Constitutional ClearStatementRules, supra note 132, at 599-600; Sunstem,
Interpreting Statutes, supra note 1, at 468-69.
"' See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 501, 504 (1979) (inter-
preting NLRB jurisdiction narrowly to avoid conflict with First Amendment); see
also Eskridge & Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Clear Statement Rules, supra note
132, at 599 n. 11 (listing cases).
3 0 SeeRICHARDPOSNERTHEFEDERALCOURTS 285 (1985) [heremafterPOSNER,
FEDERAL COURTS].
31 See Sunstem, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 1, at 468-69.
312 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988).
313 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1994).
314 See DeBartolo Corp., 485 U.S. at 570-73 (discussing § 8(b)(4) of the
National Labor Relations Act).
311 Chevron v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
316 DeBartolo Corp., 485 U.S. at 574.
317 Id. at 575 (citation omitted).
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decided to "independently inquire whether there is another interpretation,
not raisingthese serious constitutional concerns, that may fairlybe ascribed
to § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)."31 8 The Court concluded "that the section is open to a
construction that obviates deciding whether a congressional prohibition of
handbilling on the facts of this case would violate the First Amendment,"
and accordingly refused to defer to fhe Board's interpretation.319 Perhaps
because the majority opinion extensively discussed the statute's legisla-
tive history,32 Justices Scalia and O'Connor concurred in the judgment
only; Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case.
321
The controversial case of Rust v. Sullivan322 involved Department of
Health and Human Services regulations that prohibited the use of Title X
funds to support abortion counseling and referral and activities advocating
abortion as a method of family planning. Chief Justice Rehnquist's
majority opinion, joined by Justices White, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter,
refused to apply the canon disfavoring interpretations raising serious
constitutional questions. 32 The opinion rejected arguments that the
regulations violated the First Amendment rights of Title X fund recipients,
their staffs, or their patients by impermissibly imposing viewpoint-
discriminatory conditions on government subsidies, and that the agency's
interpretation violated a woman's Fifth Amendment right to choose
whether to terminate a pregnancy 324 Based implicitly upon their substan-
tive rejection of the constitutional challenges, 315 the majority held that the
regulations did not "raise the sort of 'grave and doubtful constitutional
questions[ ]' that would lead us to assume that Congress did not intend
to authorize their issuance. Therefore, we need not invalidate the regula-
tions to save the statute from unconstitutionality "326 While not strictly a
textualist opinion, Rust demonstrates that textualist judges, including
Justices Scalia and Kennedy, will join opinions that selectively employ or
ignore established canons designed to protect individual rights against
potentially overbroad interpretations of a statute.
318 Id. at 577
319 Id. at 578-88.
320 See id. at 583-88.
321 See id. at 588.
3' Rust v Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
31 See id. at 190-91.
324 See id.
325 See id. at 192-202.
326 Id. at 191 (quoting United States ex rel. Attorney General v Delaware &
Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366,408 (1909)).
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Writing for three justices, Justice Blackmun in the dissenting opinion
argued that the majority's interpretation of the statute violated both the
First Amendment right of the doctors to provide advice to patients and the
Fifth Amendment right of patients to obtain abortions. 27 Even if this
constitutional analysis was incorrect, Blackmun argued, the majority
unnecessarily addressed difficult constitutional questions, despite the canon
against doing so, because of their ideological "zeal" to uphold the
regulations.32 The majority's "facile" clai that the challenged regulations
didnot raise grave and doubtful constitutional questions was "disingenuous
at best."329 Justice Blackmun argued:
Whether or not one believes that these regulations are valid, it avoids
reality to contend that they do not give rise to serious constitutional
questions. The canon is applicable to these cases not because "it was
likely that [the regulations] would be challenged on constitutional
grounds," but because the question squarely presented by the
regulations - the extent to which the Government may attach an otherwise
unconstitutional condition to the receipt of a public benefit - implicates
a troubled area of our jurisprudence in which a court ought not entangle
itself unnecessarily 330
Justice O'Connor wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which she did
not address the ultimate constitutional issues, but relied solely on the canon
about avoiding serious constitutional questions."' She argued: "If we rule
solely on statutory grounds, Congress retains the power to force the
constitutional question by legislating more explicitly 33
2
Rust suggests that the Rehnquist Court is less willing than the Burger
Court to invoke the canon to avoid serious constitutional questions and
thereby protect individual liberties. While not strictly a textualist decision,
Rust depended on the votes of Justices Scalia and Kennedy It is notable
that the Rehnquist Court invoked this canon in a major case involving the
separation of powers, but did not invoke it when individual liberties were
at stake.333 One explanation of Rust is that it reflects deference to executive
327 See id. at 203-20 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
321 See id. at 204-05 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
329 Id. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
330 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
331 See id. at 223-25 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).332 Id. at 224 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
333 See Public Citizen v United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989);
Eskridge & Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Clear Statement Rules, supra note 132,
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agencies under the Chevron doctrine,33 4 but other decisions show that
Justice Scalia and other textualist judges are far less committed to Chevron
than many commentators initially believed.
335
V TEXTUALIST JUDGES ARE LESS LIKELY TO FOLLOW CHEVRON
In Chevron v. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc.,336 a 1984 case,
the Supreme Court announced a two-step test to determine when courts
should defer to an administrative agency's construction of a statute.337
Many commentators believed the Chevron decision would revolutionize
administrative law by makingjudges much more deferential to agencies.
38
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, the Supreme Court and
lower courts deferred no more frequently to agency interpretations, and
perhaps even less frequently, than before Chevron.33 While there are
several theories about this phenomenon, one important factor, although it
is not dispositive, is that textualist judges are less likely to defer to agency
interpretations.
34
Some commentators have suggested that Justices Scalia and Thomas,
and perhaps Justice Kennedy, are inclined to favor executive authority and
therefore might use Chevron to justify deference in too many cases.34' In
theory and in some cases, Justice Scalia is in some ways a strong supporter
of judicial deference to executive authority and of Chevron.342 Justice
Scalia and probably Justice Thomas, however, also tend to favor the
at 614-15. In Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 864 (1989), the Rehnquist
Court applied the rule against raising constitutional issues to avoid infringing on
Seventh Amendment jury rights, but in a subsequent case the Court narrowly
interpreted Gomez m a decision involving the same statutory provision. See Peretz
v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 930-34 (1991); Eskrdge & Fnckey, Quasi-
Constitutional Clear Statement Rules, supra note 132, at 615 n.103.
SSeeEskndge & Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Clear StatementRules, supra
note 132, at 618-19.
33 See infra notes 341-44, 389-96 and accompanying text.
336 Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
337 See id. at 842-43.
33 See infra notes 364-79 and accompanying text.
339 See infra notes 380-85 and accompanying text.
140 See Mank, supra note 33; infra notes 389-96 and accompanying text. Butsee
generally Maggs, supra note 18 (arguing Scalia's application of Chevron is not
dramatically different from that of other justices).
14, See mfra notes 342, 3 89-90 and accompanying text.342See mfra notes 389-90, 402-05 and accompanying text.
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protection of private property rights, which sometimes leads them to
disfavor expansive agency interpretations of statutes that restrict private
property rights.34 3 Furthermore, textualism's very methodology may lead
textualist judges to believe they are better able to interpret statutes than
agencies are, and, accordingly, to ignore the spirit of Chevron.3"
A. The Chevron Decision
Before 1984, courts were inconsistent about the degree of deference
given to administrative statutory interpretations. 345 A number of Supreme
Court decisions stated or implied that there was a presumption that courts
ought to exercise independent judgment about the meaning of statutes, and
that deference to executive interpretations required special justifications
such as an express delegation by Congress of lawmaking authority to an
agency 31 As a result, courts usually decidedwhether to defer to an agency
interpretation only after engaging in a case-specific analysis of the extent
to which the resolution of a statutory question depended on agency
"I See infra notes 421-24 and accompanying text.
3
14 See infra notes 391-95, 412-18 and accompanying text.
345 See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS §
7 4, at 348-49 (2d ed. 1992) (noting that before the Chevron decision in 1984, "the
Supreme Court maintained two inconsistent lines of cases that purported to instruct
courts concerning the proper judicial role in reviewing agency interpretations of
agency-administered statutes"); John F Manning, Constitutional Structure and
Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations ofAgency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV
612, 623-24 (1996) [hereinafter Manning, Constitutional Structure] (stating that
"the cases were not all easily reconcilable"); Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated
Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency
Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEx. L. REv 83, 93-94 (1994) (noting that before
Chevron, courts were inconsistent about the amount of deference they paid to
agency statutory interpretations; some courts were quite deferential while others
paid little heed to agency interpretations).
346 See Manning, Constitutional Structure, supra note 345, at 623-24; Merrill,
Judicial Deference, supra note 21, at 977; Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty
Cases Per Year" Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for
Judicial Review ofAgency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV 1093, 1120 (1987); see
generally Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (establishing doctrine of
cautious deference with regard to agency statutory mterpretations);NLRB v. Hearst
Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130-31 (1944) (using the theory of delegation to
support deference to National Labor Relation Board's determination that news
vendors are "employees" within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act).
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expertise, or, smilarly, of whether the statute delegated to the agency clear
authority to promulgate legislative rules.347
In 1984, however, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,48 which fundamen-
tally changed the law regarding when a court should defer to an agency's
construction of a statute.349 During the beginning of the Reaganadmiinstra-
tion, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), reversing a policy
adopted during the Carter adminimsttion, issued a revised rule interpreting
the term "stationary source" in the Clean Air Act350 to allow operators of
polluting facilities to treat all emitting devices as if they were under a
single "bubble."351 The Supreme Court chastised the court of appeals for
failing to defer to the EPA's interpretation of the statute despite the fact
that the EPA's definition of "stationary source" arguably represented a
"sharp break with prior interpretations of the Act."352
Chevron established atwo-part test for determmmgwhen courts should
defer to an agency's construction of a statute. First, a court examines
"whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue."
353
If Congress has so spoken, then the court must effectuate that intent
regardless of the agency's interpretation.354 If the statute is ambiguous,
37 See Manning, Constitutional Structure, supra note 345, at 623-24.
341 Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
349 See Merrill, JudicialDeference, supra note 21, at 975-76 (commenting that
while the Court may not have intended to do so, Chevron revolutionized the issue
of when courts should defer to agencies); Kenneth W Starr, JudicialReview in the
Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283,284 (1986) [hereinafter Starr, Judicial
Review] (same); see generally Robert Glicksman & ChnstopherH. Schroeder, EPA
and the Courts: Twenty Years ofLaw and Politics, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 1991, at 249, 286-92 (discussing Chevron); Seidenfeld, supra note 345,
at 94-99 (same).
350 42 U.S.C. § 7411(2), (3) (1994).
351 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840-41. The revised rule authorized "bubbles"
even if a source was located m an area not m compliance with the national ambient
air quality standards. See id. at 840.
352 Id. at 862-64; see also Merrill, Judicial Deference, supra note 21, at 977;
Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations ofLaw, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 517 (declaring that under Chevron, "there is no longer any
justification for giving 'special' deference to 'longstanding and consistent' agency
interpretations of law.").
353 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
354 See id. at 842-43. "The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory
construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to
clear congressional intent." Id. at 843 n.9
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however, the court m the second level of analysis must defer to the
agency's interpretation if it is "permissible," or, m other words, if it is
reasonable. 5 The Court m Chevron concluded that courts ought to defer
to reasonable agency interpretations of silent or ambiguous statutes if
Congress has expressly or implicitly delegated policymaking or law-
interpreting power to the agency 356 The Court did not provide a clear
explanation or formula for what constitutes an "implicit" delegation, but
the close of Justice Stevens' opinion suggested that a "gap" in congressio-
nal intent or statutory language might be enough in some cases to create
such an implicit delegation. 7
Justice Stevens suggestedthat agencies are usuallybetter eqippedthan
judges at filling m gaps m complex statutory schemes because agencies are
closer to the political branches and possess greater expertise.358 The Court
observed that "considerable weight should be accorded to an executive
department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to
administer"359 and further stated that "an agency to which Congress has
delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of that
delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of
wise policy to inform its judgments."360 The Chevron Court also mentioned
the EPA's expertise as a reason for deference.36'
On the other hand, in a footnote, Justice Stevens' Chevron opinion
states:
355 See Id. at 840,843-45; Starr, JudicialRevew, supra note 349, at 288 (stating
that Chevron's use of the term "permissible" is equivalent to whether agency action
is reasonable); Keith Werhan, Delegalizing Administrative Law, 1996 U. ILL. L.
REV 423,457 (same).
356 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44. If a court finds "an express delegation of
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation," the court must accept the regulation unless it is "arbitrary, capricious,
or manifestly contrary to the statute." Id. On the other hand, if the legislative
delegation is "implicit rather than explicit," the "court may not substitute its own
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency "Id. at 844. See also Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency
Interpretations ShouldBind Citizens and Courts?, 7 YALE J. ONREG. 1, 25 (1989)
(discussing Chevron's distinction between explicit and implicit delegations).
311 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66; see also Anthony, supra note 356, at 32-35
(discussing what constitutes an implicit delegation pursuant to Chevron).
358 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 856-66.
359 Id. at 844.
360 Id. at 865.
361 See id., see also Merrill, Judicial Deference, supra note 21, at 977 n.39.
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Thejudiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and
must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear
congressional intent. If a court, employing traditional tools of statu-
tory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the pre-
cise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given ef-
fect.
362
Depending upon how courts apply the "traditional tools of statutory
construction," including canons of construction, judges might be more or
less likely to defer to an agency's interpretation under Chevron's first
step.
363
Many commentators initially believed that the Chevron decision was
revolutionary and established a new framework for administrative law 31
After Chevron, a court apparently may exercise mdependentjudgment only
if Congress has spoken to the precise question at hand, and deference to
executive interpretations of statutes appears to be the norm. 65 Chevron
justifiedthis shift in presumptions by invoking democratic theory 366 Judges
362 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 (citations omitted).
363 See Mark Burge, Note, Regulatory Reform and the Chevron Doctrine: Can
Congress ForceBetterDectsionmaling by Courts andAgencies?, 75 TEx. L. REV
1085, 1094-96 (1997) (arguing that the use of canons of construction leads to a less
deferential approach to Chevron and agency interpretations).
31 See Merrill, JudicialDeference, supra note 21, at 969-70 ("Indeed, read for
all it is worth, the decision would make admimstrative actors the primary
interpreters of federal statutes and relegate courts to the largely inert role of
enforcing unambiguous statutory terms."); Sunstem, Law and Administration,
supra note 86, at 2075 (declaring that "[Chevron] has become a kind of Marbury,
or counter-Marbury, for the administrative state"); Panel Discussion, Judicial
Review ofAdministrative Action in a Conservative Era, 39 ADMIN. L. REV 353,
367 (1987) (containing observations of Professor Cass Sunstein contrasting
"strong" and "weak" readings of Chevron).
365 See Merrill, Judicial Deference, supra note 21, at 976-77
366 See Id. at 978; Richard J. Pierce, The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing
an Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV 1239, 1239 n.1 (1989)
(stating that Chevron is the best example of the Supreme Court's increasing
willingness to construct public law doctrines designed to maximize the power of
the people to control their agents). Butsee ESKRIDGE, supra note 2, at 290 (arguing
Chevron wrongly relies on democratic theory to justify judicial deference to
agencies; instead, courts should try to enforce the intent of Congress, "whose
members are elected by and accountable directly to the people").
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"are not part of either political branch," and they"have no constituency " 67
On the other hand, while agencies are "not directly accountable to the
people," they are subject to the general oversight and supervision of the
President, who is a nationally elected public official . 6 In addition,
Chevron appeared to presume that whenever Congress has delegated
authority to administer a statute, it also has delegated authority to the
agency to fill in any gaps present in the statute rather than leave that role
to the judiciary 3 69 Thus, while the traditional approach to administrative
law had viewed the interpretation of ambiguous statutes as a question of
law,3 70 Chevron transformed such interpretations into a question of an
agency policy choice.
371
There was disagreement among commentators about the extent of
judicial deference to an agency's statutory interpretations that Chevron
required.372 Commentators have debated whether Chevron announced a
new paradigm in administrative law in which agencies would have the
leading role in interpreting statutes and formulating policy with limited
367 Chevron v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66
(1984).36
1 Id. at 865; see also Merrill, Judicial Deference, supra note 21, at 978 n.44
("Chevron's democratic theory thesis appears to presuppose a unitary executive,
i.e., an interpretation of separation of powers that would place all entities engaged
in the execution of the law - including the so-called independent regulatory
agencies - under Presidential control.").
369 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (stating Congress sometimes implicitly
delegates to an agency the authority to fill a gap in a statute); Merrill, Judicial
Deference, supra note 21, at 979 ("Chevron in effect adopted a fiction that
assimilated all cases involving statutory ambiguities or gaps into the express
delegation or 'legislative rule' model."); Scalia, supra note 352, at 516-17
(suggesting Chevron presumes that ambiguities entail a delegation of interpretive
power).
170 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994) (providing that the agency's reviewing court shall
interpret constitutional and statutory provisions); Werhan, supra note 355, at 457
31 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844-45; Werhan, supra note 355, at 457
372 Compare ESKRIDGE, supra note 2, at 162-63 ("Stevens's opinion in Chevron
is a legal process exemplar. Chevron delivers the punch line for Hart and
Sack's purpose-oriented approach to statutory interpretation: especially in compli-
cated technical regulatory statutes, Congress cannot anticipate most problems of
application.") with SUNSTEIN, AFTERTHE RIGHTS, supra note 9, at 143,224 (stating
that Chevron undermines the traditional role of courts as ultimate interpreter of
statutes and allows agencies too much discretion to define the scope of their own
authority).
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judicial supervision,37 3 or merely established voluntary or flexible
prudential limitations. 74
The best explanation of Chevron is that whenever Congress writes an
ambiguous statute or one containing a "gap," it relinquishes its
policymaking discretion to the interpreter of the statute to decide among
reasonable alternative readings of the statute. 37S Before Chevron, the
Supreme Court and lower courts tried to decide on a case-by-case basis
whether Congress more likely intended m a particular statute that an
agency or a court should exercise policymakmg discretion, but the cases
were inconsistent.376 Chevron sought to decrease uncertainty about whether
373 See generally Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance
of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV 452 (1989) (arguing
Chevron implicitly redefines separation of powers); Douglas W Kmiec, Judicial
Deference to Executive Agencies and the Decline of the Nondelegation Doctrine,
2 ADMIN. L. 269 (1988) (arguing that Chevron is a logical corollary to the courts'
acceptance of extremely liberal delegations of authority to executive agencies
despite the nondelegation doctrine); Seidenfeld, supra note 345, at 96-97 (arguing
that a strong reading of Chevron "essentially transfers the primary responsibility
for interpreting regulatory statutes from the courts to the agency authorized to
admiister the statute").
374 See generally Maureen B. Callahan, Must Federal Courts Defer to Agency
Interpretations ofStatutes? A NewDoctnnalBasis for Chevron U.S.A. v Natural
Resources Defense Council, 1991 WIS. L. REV 1275 (arguing that Chevron is best
interpreted as a voluntary, prudential limitation on the Supreme Court's review of
agencies, and, therefore, should be applied flexibly, on a case-by-case basis);
Seidenfeld, supra note 345, at 94-99 (stating that while courts have disagreed to
some extent about how to read Chevron, most "lower courts have applied its
dictates with unusual consistency and often with an almost alarming rigor");
Sunstein, Law and Administration, supra note 86 (arguing Chevron should be
reinterpreted so that a reviewing court may reject reasonable agency interpretations
if court believes agency interpretation is wrong).
37 See Manning, Constitutional Structure, supra note 345, at 625; Moglen &
Pierce, supra note 138, at 1207-15; supra note 369 and accompanying text; infra
notes 377, 399, 407 and accompanying text.
376 See PIERCE Er AL., supra note 345, § 7 4, at 348-49 (noting that before the
Chevron decision in 1984, "the Supreme Court maintained two inconsistent lines
of cases that purported to instruct courts concerning the proper judicial role in
reviewing agency interpretations of agency-administered statutes"); Manning,
Constitutional Structure, supra note 345, at 623-24 (stating "the cases were not all
easily reconcilable"); Seidenfeld, supra note 345, at 93-94 (stating that before
Chevron, courts were inconsistent about the amount of deference they paid to
agency statutory interpretations; some courts were quite deferential, others paid
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a court or an agency should be the primary interpreter of a statute by
creating a presumption or fiction that when Congress has not clearly
designated the judiciary as holder of interpretive discretion, Congress has
assigned that discretion to the agency, especially if it possesses rulemaking
authority, because of both the agency's expertise and its accountability to
the political branches. 77 As subsequent cases demonstrated, however,
Chevron 's framework has not eliminated all inconsistencies in how courts
review agency interpretations; nevertheless, its intellectual rationale is
different from previous decisions and it is a significant decision regarding
how judges ought to approach such questions.78
B. How Often Do Courts Defer to Agency Interpretations?
1. Empirical Evidence
While many commentators initially assumed that Chevron would
substantially increase the likelihood that courts would affirm agency
decisions, 9 there is significant evidence that the rate of affirmance in the
Supreme Court80 and circuit courts"' is approximately the same or even
little heed to agency interpretations); supra notes 345-47 and accompanying text.377 See Mannmg, Constitutional Structure, supra note 345, at 625; Moglen &
Pierce, supra note 138, at 1207-15; supra notes 369, 375 and accompanying text;
infra notes 399, 407 and accompanying text.
1
78 See supra notes 345-47 and accompanying text.
379 See supra notes 338, 364 and accompanying text.
380 See William N. Eskndge, Jr. & Philip P Frickey, Forward: Law as Equil-
ibnum, 108 HARv. L. REv 27,72 (1994) [hereinafter Eskndge & Fnckey, Law as
Equilibrium] (stating that the Supreme Court affirmed only 62% of agency civil
cases m the 1993 term); Merrill, Judicial Deference, supra note 21, at 984 (stating
that the Supreme Court affirmed agencies about 70% of the time for the five years
following Chevron as compared to 75% of the time for the three years before).
381 See generally Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron
Puzzle, 57 LAW & CONTEMP PROBS. 65, 103 (1994) (concluding the affirmance
rate in federal appellate courts dropped from the lower-to-mid-70% range m 1983-
87 to the 60-70% range in 1988-1990); PeterH. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the
Chevron Station: An Empirical Study ofFederal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 984, 1038 (finding the rate of affirmance in federal appellate courts was 75.5%
three years after Chevron as compared to 70.9% for the year preceding the
decision; the authors conclude that Chevron significantly reduced the rate at which
federal courts of appeal remanded cases based upon rejection of an administrative
agency's interpretation of its own statute, but that effect had weakened somewhat
by 1988).
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lower than before Chevron was decided m 1984.382 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court itself has continued to apply the Chevron framework m
only about one-third of the cases presenting a deference question.8 3 As a
result oftls empirical evidence, a growing number of commentators have
questioned whether Chevron has resulted m a significant increase in
judicial deference to agency interpretations.3 4 Even some lower court
decisions have cast doubt on whether judges consistently employ
Chevron.
385
382 See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeter-
minacy in Substantive Review ofAdministrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051,
1070-71 (1995). There are significant limitations in all evidence about the impact
of Chevron because scholars disagree about how to measure when courts affirm
agency decisions, and there is the fundamental problem of comparing apples to
oranges because post-Chevron cases are not necessarily similar to those decided
before Chevron. See Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 381, at 91-92 ("Although
Merrill's data were suggestive, they did not support his conclusions. Because the
cases reviewed by the Supreme Court change over time, the overall Supreme Court
uphold rates reveal little about changes in the Court's preferences for agency
discretion and judicial deference.") 1
383 See Merrill, Judicial Deference, supra note 21, at 982; see also Merrill,
Textualism, supra note 20, at 361-62 (explaining that the Supreme Court largely
ignored the Chevron framework during the 1992 Term); Shapiro & Levy, supra
note 382, at 1071 (citing Merrill's work). But see Cohen& Spitzersupra note 381,
at 91-92 (questioning Merrill's data).
384 See Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia Meets Tax Hyperopia: The Unproven Case
of Increased Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 637, 657
n. 123 (citing sources), 657-60 (1996); Merrill, Textualism, supra note 20, at 36 1-62
(finding that Chevron appeared to be playing "an increasingly peripheral role in the
decisions" of the Supreme Court during its 1991 and 1992 Terms, and that the
decision was employed as "just another pair of pliers in the statutory interpretation
tool chest"). But see Pierce, supra note 62, at 749-50 ("The Chevron test has
largely realized its potential at the circuit court level. Appellate courts routinely
accord deference to agency constructions of ambiguous language in agency-
administered statutes."); Seidenfeld, supra note 345, at 84 n.5 ("Although
[Merrill's Judicial Deference article, supra note 21] has led some commentators
to question whether Chevron represents the revolution in administrative law that
many have proclaimed, the lower courts' consistent application probably has a
greater day-to-day impact on the administrative operation of the state.") (citations
omitted).
3 5 See Mississippi Poultry Ass'n v Madigan, 31 F.3d 293, 299 n.34 (5th Cir.
1994) (observing that "Chevron is not quite the 'agency deference' case that it is
commonly thought to be by many of its supporters (and detractors)"); Ohio State
Univ v Secretary, United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 996 F.2d 122,
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2. Why Have Judges Not Followed Chevron?
Some commentators argue that Chevron has not produced greater
judicial deference to agency determinations because the decision's
framework is inherently indeterminate and manipulable.8 6 As a result,
judges can use Chevron to justify decisions based upon their ideological
preferences.8 7 These commentators, however, do not fully explain why so
many observers, who presumably understood that judges retain some
discretion in applying Chevron's framework, thought that the decision
would have greater impact.
Some scholars believe that judges appointed by President Reagan,
including Justice Scalia and many other new textualists, were more likely
to defer to agency interpretations during the Reagan administration, but
became less deferential during the more politically liberal Bush and Clinton
administrations. 88 There is some empirical support for this hypothesis, but
a purely political explanation ofjudicial behavior seems too simplistic.
3. Textualist Judges and Chevron
Presidents Reagan and Bush appointed a number of "new" textualist
judges shortly after the Supreme Court decided Chevron. There has been
a debate among scholars about whether textualist judges are more, less, or
equally likely to defer to agency interpretations.
123 n.1 (6th Cir. 1993), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 512 U.S. 1231
(1994); Combee v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 248, 257 n.22 (1993) (Steinberg, J.,
dissenting from en banc denial of reivew), rev'd on other grounds, 34 F.3d 1039
(Fed. Cir. 1994); Caron, supra note 384, at 659-60.
386 See Caron, supra note 384, at 658-59; Shapiro & Levy, supra note 382, at
1069-72.
387 See Caron, supra note 384, at 659; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Legislative Reform
ofJudicialReview ofAgency Actions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1110, 1110 (1995); Shapiro &
Levy, supra note 382, at 1071-72; see also Zeppos, supra note 37, at 1334 n.179
("[T]he effect of Chevron may [have been] more in the area ofjudicial rhetoric
than actual judicial decision-making.").
388 See Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 381, at 68; see also Eskridge & Fnckey,
Law as Equilibrium, supra note 380, at 76 (stating the 1993 Supreme Court term
provides "some evidence" that conservative justices are less likely to affirm more
liberal Clinton administration policies); Pierce, supra note 62, at 780 ("By the
1993-1994 Term, the Court had a majority of conservative Justices who could
predict that they would prevail in most disputes with respect to the meaning of an
ambiguous statute. It follows that the conservative Justices would be even less
likely to defer to an agency during the 1993-1994 Term.").
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Many commentators have argued that Justice Scalia is philosophically
inclined to support executive power and, therefore, likely to invoke
Chevron too often 89 Several commentators have suggested that Justice
Scalia and many other "new" textualists are more likely to defer to
admmstrative agencies because they refuse to consider legislative history
that might contradict the agency's interpretation and show that the statute
has a clear meaning. 39 Commentators who argue that the refusal of Justice
Scalia and other textualists to give independent consideration to legislative
history leads them to be more deferential to agency interpretations,
however, wrongly assume that textualists are more likely than followers of
other theories of statutory interpretation to find that a statute is ambiguous.
If textualists were really more deferential to agency interpretations, one
would have expected to see courts becoming more likely to follow Chevron
during the late 1980s and early 1990s as more textualist judges gamed
positions of influence, but instead there appears to be less deference. The
only possible explanation, for these commentators, is that textualistjudges
have become less deferential for political reasons as the White House
shifted from Presidents Reagan to Bush to Clinton.
Some scholars believe that textualist judges are less likely to defer to
agency interpretations. 91 During the late 1980s and early 1990s, when
courts may have become less faithful to Chevron, it is notable that the
Supreme Court increasingly used a textualist approach to statutory
interpretation.392 Some scholars have argued that textualist statutory
interpretation has led to less judicial deference to agency interpretations
because textualist judges often believe they can find the one "correct"
389 See Maggs, supra note 18, at 401-04 (summarizing and citing arguments of
commentators who believe that Justice Scalia defers too often to administrative
agencies); William D. Popkm, Law-Maling Responsibility and Statutory
Interpretation, 68 IND. L.J. 865,872 n.36 (1993) [heremafterPopkm, Law-Malang
Responsibility]; Bernard Schwartz, "Shooting the Piano Player"? Justice Scalia
and Administrative Law, 47 ADMIN. L. REv 1, 50 (1995); Sunstem, Interpreting
Statutes, supra note 1, at 430 n.91.
390 See Maggs, supra note 18, at 401-04 (summanzmg and citing arguments of
commentators who believe that Justice Scalia defers too often to administrative
agencies); Popkin, Law-MakngResponsibility, supra note 389, at 872; Schwartz,
supra note 389, at 50; Sunstem, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 1, at 430 n.91.
391 See Maggs, supra note 18, at 404-06 (summarizing and citing sources);
Merrill, Textualism, supra note 20, at 353-55,372-73; Merrill, JudicialDeference,
supra note 21, at 970; Pierce, supra note 62, at 750-52; see supra notes 340, 344
and accompanying text; infra notes 392-95, 412-18 and accompanying text.392See infra notes 394-95 and accompanying text.
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interpretation or "plain meaning" of a statute through a textual analysis. 93
During the 1988 to 1990 terms, just as Justice Scalia's textualist approach
began to strongly influence the Court, the Supreme Court was less likely
to defer to agency statutory constructions than it had been during the 1985
and 1986 terms. 94 From 1990 to 1994, the Supreme Court often used a
textualist approach to find that a statute had a "plain meaning" and an
agency's interpretation of the statute was therefore not entitled to Chevron
deference.
395
Another commentator, however, maintains that Justice Scalia's record
of applying Chevron is not dramatically different from that of other justices
of the Supreme Court.396 While it is an overstatement to claim that Justice
Scalia's approach to Chevron is radically different from that of other
judges, his textualist views do make him less deferential than nontextualist
judges in at least some types of cases.
Because Justice Scalia is the most promient exponent of textualism
on the Supreme Court, an examination of his approach to Chevron is a
logical place to begin to study whether the rise of textualism is a factor
affecting how courts apply Chevron.
C. Justice Scalia and Chevron
1. Justice Scalia: Chevron as a Presumption
In theory, Justice Scalia strongly supports Chevron. He explains that
"the theoretical justification for Chevron is no different from the theoretical
" See Maggs, supra note 18, at 404-06 (summarizing and citing sources);
Merrill, Textualism, supra note 20, at 353-55,372-73; Merrill, JudicialDeference,
supra note 21, at 970; Pierce, supra note 62, at 750-52; supra notes 340,344,391-
92 and accompanying text; mnfra notes 394-95, 412-18 and accompanying text.
394 See Merrill, Judicial Deference, supra note 21, at 990-93. But see Cohen &
Spitzer, supra note 381, at 91-92 ("Although Merrill's data were suggestive, they
did not support his conclusions. Because the cases reviewed by the Supreme Court
change over time, the overall Supreme Court uphold rates reveal little about
changes in the Court's preferences for agency discretion andjudicial deference.").
395 See Merrill, Textualism, supra note 20, at 355-63, 372-73 (arguing that the
Supreme Court's use of a textualist approach to statutory interpretation resulted in
less Chevron deference during the 1992 term); Pierce, supra note 62, at 750-52,
762-63 (arguing that the Supreme Court during the 1993-94 term applied a
"hypertextualist" approach that led to insufficient application of the Chevron
deference principle).
396 See Maggs, supra note 18, at 395, 409-16.
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justification for those pre-Chevron cases that sometimes deferred to agency
legal determinations," and is simply a matter of congressional Intent. 97 He
maintains that "[a]n ambiguity in a statute committed to agency implemen-
tation can be attributed to either of two congressional desires: (1) Congress
intended a particular result, but was not clear about it; or (2) Congress had
no particular intent on the subject, but meant to leave its resolution to the
agency "398 Whilepre-Chevron cases tnedto distinguish between situations
one and two on a statute-by-statute basis, Chevron established "an across-
the-board presumption that, in the case of ambiguity, agency discretion is
meant," and established that courts should uphold an agency's exercise of
that discretion whenever it is reasonable.399
Justice Scalia articulates several reasons to support this presumption.
First, he believes that it "is a more rational presumption than it would have
been thirty years ago" because of the growth of the adminimstrative state and
the need for expertise.' Furthermore, he contends that even "[i]f the
Chevron rule is not a 100% accurate estimation of modem congressional
intent, the prior case-by-case evaluation was not so either;" accordingly,
the Chevron rule "is unquestionably better than what preceded it." ''
In addition, Justice Scalia thinks that there are a number of positive
policy consequences that flow from Chevron 's across-the-board presump-
tion that courts should defer to reasonable agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutes. "Congress now knows that the ambiguities it creates,
whether intentionally or unintentionally, will be resolved, within the
bounds of permissible interpretation, not by the courts but by a particular
agency, whose policy biases will ordinarily be known.4 0 2 Accordingly,
because courts no longer search for a statute's single "correct" meaning,
but instead defer to permissible agency interpretations, he argues that there
is no longer any justification for the traditional judicial rule giving
"special" deference to "long-standing and consistent" agency interpreta-
tions of a statute.43 As a result, he predicts that the abandonment of
consistency will provide "major advantages from the standpoint of
governmental theory" by providing agencies with the flexibility to change
policies to respond to new political forces, social attitudes, or
... Scalia, supra note 352, at 516.
39 8 1d.
399 Id.
400Id.
401 Id. at 517
402 Id.
403 See id.
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mnformation.4" Because judicial interpretations of a statute usually are
difficult to change even m the face of changing social conditions, Scalia
concludes that "the capacity of the Chevron approach to accept changes m
agency interpretation ungrudgingly seems to me one of the strongest
indications that the Chevron approach is correct."405
Justice Scalia's somewhat implicit and somewhat explicit blessing of
Chevron is consistent with hIs overall effort to reduce statutory interpreta-
tion to a series of simple, objective rules of interpretation.0 6 For Justice
Scalia, Chevron is a rule of decision that assigns the resolution of
ambiguous statutes to executive agencies and gives notice to Congress that
it must write clear statutes or expect courts to defer to any reasonable
executive interpretation. °7
2. What is Ambiguous?
Justice Scalia has argued that if Chevron is to have meaning, a statute
must be regarded as ambiguous even if a court believes its own interpreta-
tion is superior to an agency's as long as "two or more reasonable, though
not necessarily equally valid, interpretations exist," and that Chevron
"suggests that the opposite of 'ambiguity' is not 'resolvability' but rather
'clarity ""40 Justice Scalia warns that "Chevron becomes virtually
meaningless if ambiguity exists only when the arguments for and
against the various possible interpretations are in absolute equipose. ' 4 9 He
maintains thatjudges must avoid the temptation to use the various possible
techniques of statutory interpretation as a way to avoid finding that a
statute is ambiguous when multiple reasonable interpretations exist, even
if they are not equally valid s.4 0 He has argued that it is especially inappro-
priate to consider legislative history when an agency interprets a statute
because reliance upon such nontextual material to contradict an agency
interpretation would transform the Chevron principle into "a doctrine of
desperation," permitting deference only when courts cannot find any
extrinsic evidence that might challenge the agency's interpretation.4"
414Id. at 517-19.
415 Id. at 517-18.
4
1 See Sheldon, supra note 43, at 508-14; supra notes 397-405 and accompany-
ing text.407 See Sheldon, supra note 43, at 509
408 Scalia, supra note 352, at 520 (footnote omitted).
409 Id.
410 See id. at 520; see also Maggs, supra note 18, at 421.
411 Maggs, supra note 18, at 454 (quoting Justice Scalia).
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3. Textualism and Less Deference to Chevron
While Justice Scalia in many ways supports the Chevron doctrine, he
has indicated that textualist judges may need to use it less often than
interpreters who consult legislative history He has observed that how one
addresses the question of "how clear is clear" under Chevron 's first step
affects one's view "of what Chevron means and whether Chevron is
desirable."4 2 Scalia argues that "'strict constructiomst[s]' of statutes," '413
by which he apparently means followers of his textualist approach to
interpretation, are more likely to support Chevron because they are less
likely to need to employ it, and that those who examine legislative history
are more troubled by the case because they are more likely to find that a
statute is ambiguous and, accordingly, that a court must defer to an
agency's permissible construction.414
One who finds more often (as I do) that the meaning of a statute is
apparent from its text and from its relationship with other laws, thereby
finds less often that the triggering requirement for Chevron deference
exists. It is thus relatively rare that Chevron will require me to accept an
interpretation which, though reasonable, I would not personally adopt.
Contrariwise, one who abhors a "plain meaning" rule, and is willing to
permit the apparent meaning of a statute to be impeached by the legisla-
tive history, will more frequently find agency-liberating ambiguity, and
will discern a much broader range of "reasonable" interpretation that the
agency may adopt and to which the courts must pay deference. The
frequency with which Chevron will require that judge to accept an
interpretation he thinks wrong is infinitely greater.415
If a statute has a clear textual meaning, courts should give no deference
to the agency's interpretation. In EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.,411
Justice Scalia argued in his concurring opinion: "[D]eference is not
abdication, and it requires us to accept only those agency interpretations
that are reasonable in light oftheprinciples of construction courts normally
employ ,417
412 Scalia, supra note 352, at 521.
413 Id.
414 See id.
415 Id., see also Michael E. Herz, Textualism and Taboo: Interpretation and
Deferencefor Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REV 1663, 1670 & n.33 (1991).
416 EEOC v Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
417 Id. at 260 (Scalia, J., concumng in part and concurring in the judgment).
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Justice Scalia does not appear to appreciate entirely the irony of
vigorously supporting Chevron because he does not expect to invoke its
doctrine very often when he himself is interpreting a statute. He does not
acknowledge that what he believes is the value of Chevron in promoting
flexible agency reinterpretations of a statute is considerably dimimshed if
a textualist judge usually concludes that a statute is clear and so no
deference is owed to an agency interpretation. One also wonders why he is
so worried that nontextualists judges who consult legislative history will
deliberately not follow Chevron, if textualists rarely need to use the case.
Probably, this is because he fears" nontextualist judges will reach an
interpretation based on legislative history that is at odds with how he would
interpret the plain meaning of the text, and he is more willing to trust an
agency's interpretation than that of a nontextualist judge. Whether he is
correct that textualist judges are less likely to invoke Chevron remains a
matter of controversy 411
D. Sweet Home
Justice Scalia's adherence to textualism often leads him to believe that
he can find the one "correct" interpretation of even a very complex
statutory and regulatory scheme, and, accordingly, to give no deference to
an agency's interpretation.419 In Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communitiesfor a Great Oregon,420 Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, selectively used canons of construction to
narrow the statute, but ignored the broad purposes of the Endangered
Species Act and the Chevron deference principle.
Scalia's dissenting opinion m Sweet Home may also reflect an
overall philosophy of protecting private property against "excessive"
government regulation while often declining to find that regulatory
beneficiaries of public interest statutes have standing.42' Justice
418 See supra notes 340, 344, 391-95, 412-17 and accompanying text.
419 See, e.g., Pauley v Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 706-07 (1991)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (refusing to defer to the Secretary of Labor's interpretation
of HEW's regulations implementing Black Lung Benefits Act because m his view
"the HEW regulations are susceptible of only one meaning, although they are
so mncate that meaning is not immediately accessible").
420 Babbitt v Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S.
687 (1995).
421 See Karkkainen, supra note 11, at 462-64; Mank, supra note 33, at 1249
n.9 1, Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing and Public Law Litigation, 42
DUKEL.J. 1141, 1167-68 (1993) (contending Justice Scalia's approach to standing
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Thomas 42 and Chief Justice Rehnquist423 share with Justice Scalia sinilar
"threatens to constitutionalize an unbalanced scheme of regulatory review" in
which "courts can protect the interests of regulated entities" while "'regulatory
beneficianes' are left to the political process"); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 562-68, 571-73 (1992) (holding environmental plaintiffs who only
occasionally view endangered species cannot show concrete "injury-in-fact" and,
therefore, lack standing to challenge agency action under Endangered Species Act);
see generally Cass R. Sunstem, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits,
"Injurtes," andArticle ll, 91 MICH. L. REV 163 (1992) (arguing Justice Scalia's
approach to standing in Lujan favors private economic interests and favors mere
beneficiaries of public interest statutes). Justice Scalia also has been strongly
protective of private property interests in cases holding that government regulation
constitutes a taking of private property under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019
(1992) (holding government regulation that deprives private property owner of
100% of value always constitutes a taking of private property under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments); Nollan v California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825
(1987) (holding government regulation must be reasonably related to public need
or burden and that government may not condition granting of permit on compliance
with exaction unrelated to harm caused by private activity).
" In takings cases, Justice Thomas has joined majority opinions holding that
government regulation deprives property owner of rights under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994)
(holding government has burden of demonstrating that there is a "reasonable
relationship" between the exactions imposed by government regulation and the
projected impacts of private property owner); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 (holding
government regulation that deprives private property owner of 100% of value
always constitutes a taking of private property under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments). In environmental cases, Justice Thomas has tended to favor private
interests over government regulation. See, e.g., Citizens Against Burlington, Inc.
v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190,206 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Thomas, J.) (concluding thatFederal
Aviation Administration could limit discussion of alternatives in environmental
impact statement to those proposed by private applicant).
423 See, e.g., Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (holding government has burden of demon-
strating that there is "reasonable relationship" between the exactions imposed by
government regulation and the projected impacts of private property owner); First
Evangelical Lutheran Church v County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987)
(holding temporary regulation of private property preventing any use may
constitute a taking ofproperty under Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments); Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (Rehnqumst, C.J.,
dissenting) (arguing that because a mining regulation allows the state to prohibit
any use of "support estate," it constitutes "taking" of property under Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
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views about the protection ofpnvate property from government regulation.
Justice Kennedy has generally supported the protection of private property
rights and a restrictive approach to standing regulatory beneficiaries of
public interest statutes, but often has written concurring opinions suggest-
ing a less rigid approach than that taken by Justice Scalia or Chief Justice
Rehnquist.424
1. The Endangered Species Act of 1973
Section 9(a)(1)(B) of the Endangered Species Act of 197311 makes it
unlawful for any person to "take" an endangered species,426 and section
3(14)427 defines "take" to mean to "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt to engage in any such
conduct." '42 In a resulting regulation, the Fish & Wildlife Service of the
Interior Department, acting under the authority of the Secretary ofIntenor,
defined the word "harm" i section 3(14) of the Act to include "significant
habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures
wildlife."429
2. The D.C. Circuit and Noscitur a Sociis
In 1992, small logging companies and other groups from Oregon filed
a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia against the Secretary of Interior, contending that the
regulation's definition of "take" was broader than Congress intended when
it enacted the statute,430 but the court rejected all of the plaintiffs' chal-
104 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that a regulation preventing owner
of historic building from using "air" rights above landmark building constitutes
"taking" of property under Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
424 See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1032-36 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 579-81 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concumng in
the judgment).
425 Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 9(a)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B)
(1994).
426 See id.,see also StarlaK. Dill, Note, AnimalHabitats n Harm's Way: Sweet
Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v Babbitt, 25 ENVTL. L. 513,
516 (1995).
427 Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 3(14), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1994).
42s Id., see also Dill, supra note 426, at 516.
429 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1998); see also Dill, supra note 426, at 516.
430 See Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. v Lujan, 806 F
Supp. 279 (D.D.C. 1992), modified sub nom., Sweet Home Chapter of
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lenges and granted summary judgment for the government, finding "that
Congress intended an expansive interpretation of the word 'take,' an
interpretation that encompasses habitat modification." 43' In its first
decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit initially affirmed the lower court's decision, but the panel split two-
to-one over the issue of whether the section 9 regulation was facially
invalid, and all three judges wrote separate opinions.432 In the majority,
Chief Judge Mikva thought that the Fish and Wildlife Service's interpreta-
tion was entitled to Chevron deference because the statute was ambiguous
and the agency interpretation was reasonable.433 Judge Williams, however,
thought that the regulation was inconsistent with the statute's textual
language, but that Congress in amending the Act in 1982 had implicitly
ratified the regulation's restrictions on habitat modification by private
individuals by creating an incidental-take permit scheme that created
exceptions to those restrictions. Accordingly, he stated that Congress'
establishment of the permit system "support[s] the inference that the ESA
otherwise forbids some such incidental takings, including habitat
modification. 434
Inhis dissenting opinion, Judge Sentelle acknowledgedthere was some
ambiguity about the meaning of the word "harm" in the statute, but invoked
the noscitur a sociis canon of statutory construction, which suggests that
words grouped in a statutory list be given a related meaning,435 to conclude
that the term "harm," as used in the statute, must be read narrowly to allow
the Fish and Wildlife Service to impose civil or criminal liability only
where a private landowner has taken direct action against a species. 436 Even
Communities for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994), rev'd, 515
U.S. 687 (1995); see also David A. Schlesinger, Comment, Chevron Unlatined:
The Inapplicability of the Canon Noscitur A Sociis Under Prong One of the
Chevron Framework, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 638, 678 (1996).
431 SweetHome, 806 F Supp. at 282,285; see also Schlesinger, supra note 430,
at 678; see generally Craig Robert Baldauf, Comment, Searchingfor a Place to
Call Home: Courts, Congress, and Common Killers Conspire to Drive Endangered
Species Into Extinction, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV 847 (1995).
432 See Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. v Babbitt, 1 F.3d
1 (D.C. Cir. 1994), modified, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994), rev'd, 515 U.S. 687
(1995).
433 See id. at 8-11 (Mikva, C.J., concurnng in section II(A)(1) of the opinion).
434 Id. at 11 (Williams, J., concurring in section II(A)(1)).
43 See Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26,36 (1990) (defining the canon
noscitur a sociis); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1060 (6th ed. 1990) (same);
Schlesinger, supra note 430, at 640 (same).436See Sweet Home, 1 F.3d at 12 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
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if the word "harm" was ambiguous under the first prong of Chevron, it was
unreasonable under the second prong for the Service to define "harm" and
"take" to include "significant habitat modification or degradation."437 Judge
Sentelle applied the noscitur a sociis canon to limit the meaning of "harm,"
and to conclude that the Service's broad reading to include habitat
modification was unreasonable under Chevron's second step.438 "In the
present statute, all the other terms among which 'harm' finds itself keeping
company relate to an act which a specifically acting human does to a
specific individual representative of a wildlife species." '439 In addition,
Judge Sentelle applied another rule of statutory construction, the presump-
tion against surplusage, to argue that "[tihe construction placed upon the
word 'harm' by the agency and adopted by the court today renders
superfluous everything else in the definition of 'take."'" 0 As a result of
reading "harm" narrowly, Judge Sentelle argued there was no "reasonable
way that the term 'take' can be defined to include 'significant habitat
modification or degradation.'"" Judge Williams agreed with much of
Sentelle's dissent, stating: "But for the 1982 amendments, I would find
Judge Sentelle's analysis highlypersuasive-including his discussion of the
noscitur a sociis canon." 42
Judge Williams was clearly troubled by his own opinion n the first
case because the panel quickly agreed to rehear the case, and partially
reversed its decision."3 In the second decision, Judge Williams changed his
vote and largely adopted Judge Sentelle's noscitur a sociis argument.4"
Although conceding that "[t]he potential breadth of the word 'harm' is
indisputable,"" the majority concluded that the immediate statutory
context in which Congress placed "harm" strongly suggested a narrow
interpretation of the word, limiting "harm" only to "the perpetrator's direct
application of force against the animal taken The forbidden acts fit, In
ordinary language, the basic model 'A hit B.' "446 The majority contended
that Congress could not have intended to cnmmalize behavior by private
437 See Id. (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
... See id. (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
439 Id. (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
441 Id. at 13 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
441 Id. at 12 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
442 Id. at 11 (Williams, J., concumng in Section H(A)(1) of the opinion).
"3 See SweetHome Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d
1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994), rev'd, 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
4 See id. at 1464-72.
445 Id. at 1464.
446 Id. at 1465.
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individuals that could apply to vast amounts of land, including the thirty-
five to forty-two million acres of critical habitat in which grizzly bears
live."7 Accordingly, it was appropriate to apply the noscitur a sociis canon
to avoid the Fish and Wildlife Service's overly broad interpretation of
"harm." 8 Judge Williams concluded that the 1982 "incidental-take permit"
amendment to section 10 did not change the meaning of the term "take" as
defined in the 1973 statute.449
In his concurring opinon, Judge Sentelle "jom[ed] with enthusiasm
those portions of Judge Williams's opinion that rely on the structure of the
Act and on the maxim noscitur a sociis" and repeated Ins surplusage
argument from his earlier dissent, but found it unnecessary to rely on the
legislative history in Judge Williams's opinion.450
In dissent, Chief Judge Mikva argued that the noscitur a sociis canon
should not be applied in this case because the surrounding words in the
statute were too ambiguous to provide a clear meaning to the term "harm,"
questioned whether it was even appropriate to invoke "a seldom-used and
indeterminate principle of statutory construction," and argued that the
statute's legislative history strongly supportedthe Secretary's definition.45'
Chief Judge Mikva also criticized the majority for placing the burden on
the government to prove it was acting within the scope of the statute and
for failing to specify under which prong of Chevron it was deciding the
case.412 The Department of the Interior suggested a rehearing en bane, but
the full D.C. Circuit refused, with fourjudges dissenting.453
47 See id.
448 See id. at 1465-66.
44' Compare Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. v Babbitt,
1 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Williams, J., concumng in part ll(A)(1)) (arguing
1982 amendments changed meaning of "take") with Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Or. v Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463, 1467-72 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(arguing 1982 amendments did not change meaning of "take"), rev'd, 515 U.S. 687
(1995).
450 Sweet Home, 17 F.3d at 1472-73 (Sentelle, J., concurring), rev'd, 515 U.S.
687 (1995).
4-1 Id. at 1474-75 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting).
412 See Id. at 1473-74 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting).
4 3 See Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 30 F.3d
190 (D.C. Cir. 1994), rev'd, 515 U.S. 687 (1995). Judge Silberman wrote a
dissenting opinion joined by Chief Judge Mikva and Judge Wald. See id. at 194
(Silberman, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Judge Rogers also
dissented from the denial of rehearing en bane but did notjoin Judge Silberman's
opinion. See id. at 191.
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3. Justice Stevens's Majority Opinion
In a six-to-three decision, the Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit
and upheld the Fish and Wildlife Service's broad regulation of private
landowners.4 4 Justice Stevens's majority opinion argued that the text of the
statute provided three reasons for concluding that the Secretary of Interior's
interpretation of the statute is reasonable."' 5 First, the Court used the
dictionary definition of the verb form of "harm," which is "to cause hurt or
damage to: injure," to find that the agency's definition was consistent with
the "ordinary understanding" of the word, and that such a "definition
naturally encompasses habitat modification that results in actual injury or
death to members of an endangered or threatened species."456 Additionally,
Justice Stevens rejected the argument that the word "harm" in the Act
should be limited to direct attempts to kill an endangered species and not
applied to indirect harms resulting from habitat destruction. He pointed out
that the dictionary definition does not limit itself to direct injuries and,
furthermore, that the word "harm" as used in the statute would be mere
surplusage unless it encompassed indirect harms.457 Second, the Court
found that "the broad purpose of the ESA supports the Secretary's decision
to extend protection against activities that cause the precise harms
Congress enacted the statute to avoid."5 8 Third, the Court concluded that
Congress' 1982 amendments to section 10 of the statute, known as the
"incidental take" permit provision,459 was evidence that Congress under-
stood the Act to apply to indirect as well as direct harm because the most
likely use for such a permit was to avert liability for habitat modification.4 60
Tis section allows the Secretary to grant an exception to section
"' See Babbitt v Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515
U.S. 687 (1995). Justice Stevens wrote for a majority including Justices Kennedy,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, with Justice O'Connor concumng. See id. at 688.
Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Thomas. See id. at 714 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
455 See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 697
456 Id.
47 See id. at 697-98.
458 Id. at 699. The Supreme Court reaffirmed its reasoning in TVA v. Hill, in
which it stated that "'[t]he plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute'
'was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost. This
is reflected not only in the stated policies of the Act, but in literally every section
of the statute."' Id. (quoting TVA v Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978)).
419 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (1994).
46o See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 700.
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9(a)(l)(B)'s prohibition against takings of endangered species by granting
a permit to an individual whose activities will cause incidental harm to an
endangered species so long as the applicant provides a satisfactory
conservation plan for minimizing any such harm.46" ' Additionally, the Court
stated that the plain meaning of section 10's requirement of a conservation
plan makes sense only as "an alternative to a known, but undesired, habitat
modification." 2 Accordingly, the majority concluded that the agency's
interpretation was a reasonable reading of the statutory terms.463 Further-
more, Justice Stevens observed that the statute's legislative history
provided additional evidence that Congress had envisioned the possibility
of a regulation similar to the one at issue m the case.464
Justice Stevens's majority opinion also applied the noscitur a sociis
and presumption-against-surplusage canons of construction to conclude
that the agency's interpretation was reasonable, but only by applying them
m a manner directly opposite to that used by the court of appeals. This
lends support to Karl Llewellyn's criticism that the canons can often
support contradictory interpretations of statutory language.465 In Sweet
Home, the Court criticized the court of appeals' use of the noscitur a sociis
canon to conclude that "'harm' must refer to a direct application of force
because the words around it do."' First, the Court stated that "[s]everal of
the words that accompany 'harm' m the § 3 definition of 'take,' especially
'harass,' 'pursue,' 'wound,' and 'kill,' refer to actions or effects that do not
require the direct applications of force," and therefore, the court of appeals
had erred in arguing that all other terms besides "harm" m the definition
clearly refer to direct applications of force.467 Moreover, Justice Stevens
argued that the noscitur a sociis canon does not require a court to treat all
the words in a list as having the same meaning. Rather, it suggests that
words in such a list are likely to have related but separate meanings. 468
461 See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B).
462 Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 701 n.14.
463 See id. at 697; see also Burge, supra note 363, at 1103 ("Justice Stevens
cited reasons for determining that the Intenor Department's interpretation was
'reasonable' based upon the 'text of the Act' and thus implied a decision based
upon step two of Chevron.") (quoting Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 695); infra notes
476-80 and accompanying text.
46 See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 699.
465 See Burge, supra note 363, at 1102; supra notes 97-98 and accompanying
text
466 Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 701.
467 Id.
461 See id. at 702.
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Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that "[t]he statutory context of
'harm' suggests that Congress meant that term to serve a particular
function in the ESA, consistent with but distinct from the functions of the
other verbs used to define 'take.' 69
Furthermore, Justice Stevens invoked the presumption against
surplusage in a far different manner than had Judge Sentelle, arguing that
Congress must have had a purpose for adding the word "harm" to the long
list defining "take." Therefore, it was likely that the legislature intended the
term "harm" to have a meaning different from other words in the
definition.47 Justice Stevens criticized the court of appeals for giving the
word "'harm' essentially the same function as other words in the defim-
tion, thereby denying it independent meaning. '7i While Judge Sentelle had
argued that a broad definition of the term "harm" violated the presumption
against surplusage by rendering the other terms useless,4 72 Justice Stevens
argued that a narrow definition of "harm" made the word ineffectual and
mere surplusage by giving it the same meaning as other defining terms for
the word "take." '473 Justice Stevens concluded that "unless the statutory
term 'harm' encompasses indirect as well as direct injuries, the word has
no meaning that does not duplicate the meaning of other words that section
3 uses to define 'take.'74 Accordingly, Justice Stevens concluded that
both the noscitur a sociis and the presumption-agamst-surplusage canons
supported the Service's interpretation of "harm" to encompass a broader
range of behavior than the other words defining "take," including a
prohibition against habitat modification by private landowners. 475
Finally, the Court invoked the Chevron deference principle, finding
that the definition of the word "harm" in the statute was ambiguous and
that the Secretary's interpretation was reasonable.476 Citing a 1986 law
469 Id.
47
' See id. at 697-703.
471 Id. at 702.
41 See Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d
1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Sentelle, J., dissenting), modified, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir.
1994), rev'd, 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
' See Babbitt v Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515
U.S. 687, 697-98, 701-02 (1995).
474 Id. at 697-98.
475 See id. at 697-98, 701-02; supra notes 465-74 and accompanying text.
476 See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 704. Additionally, the Court found that the
legislative history of the statute supported the conclusion that the Secretary's
definition of harm was based upon a permissible construction of the Act. See id. at
704-07
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review article by then-Judge Breyer,477 the majority asserted that "[t]he
latitude the ESA gives the Secretary m enforcing the statute, together with
the degree of regulatory expertise necessary to its enforcement, establishes
that we owe some degree of deference to the Secretary's reasonable
interpretation,"478 andthat"[w]hen it enacted the ESA, Congress delegated
broad admimstrative and interpretive power to the Secretary The
proper interpretation of a term such as 'harm' involves a complex policy
choice. "N 79 Citing Chevron, the Court stated, "When Congress has entrusted
the Secretary with broad discretion, we are especially reluctant to substitute
our views of wise policy for his," and concluded that the "Secretary
reasonably construed the intent of Congress when he defined 'harm' to
include 'significant habitat modification or degradation that actually kills
or injures wildlife."' 80
4. Justice Scalia 's Dissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia argued that the words "take"
and "harm" as used in the Act could not possibly mean "habitat modifica-
tion," and that under Chevron's first step Congress clearly did not intend
to authorize a regulation as broad as the one issued by the Fish and Wildlife
Servce.4 1 While acknowledging that the verb "harm" has a range of
meanings, Justice Scalia argued that "the more directed sense of 'harm' is
a somewhat more common and preferred usage" according to style manuals
and dictionaries.482 Even more importantly, he contended that to define
"harm" to include indirect actions by private individuals that cause habitat
modification "is to choose a meaning that makes nonsense" of the term
"take" in the statute, and, accordingly, judges should reject such a strained
interpretation of the word "harm" unless there is "the strongest evidence to
make us believe that Congress has defined a term m a manner repugnant to
its ordinary and traditional sense. '483 Additionally, Justice Scalia argued
that a broad reading of the word "harm" was mconsistent with the statute's
structure and several of its other terms, including its civil and criminal
477 See id. at 703-04 (citing Stephen G. Breyer, JudicialReview of Questions of
Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV 363, 373 (1986)).
478 Id. at 703.
4 79 Id. at 708.
481Id. (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1998)).
481 See id. at 714-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
482 Id. at 719 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
483Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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penalties and its forfeiture provisions.484 Furthermore, Justice Scalia relied
on the following external sources in finding a narrow definition of"take"
an 1896 Supreme Court decision; Blackstone's Commentaries; a statute
implementing a migratory bird treaty; and a 1973 treaty governing polar
bear conservation.45 He concluded, "There is neither textual support for
nor even evidence of congressional consideration of" the agency's
interpretation of the statute.486
Justice Scalia also relieduponthe noscitura sociis canon in concluding
that the regulation was invalid.487 While conceding the majority's point that
some of the words surrounding the term "harm" can refer to indirect
applications of force, Justice Scalia maintained, "What the nine other
words in § 1532(19) have in common - and share with the narrower
meaning of 'harm' described above, but not with the Secretary's ruthless
dilation of the word - is the sense of affirmative conduct intentionally
directed against a particular animal or anmals. '488 Thus, Scalia agreed with
Judges Williams and Sentelle that the application of noscitur a sociis
resulted in a narrowing of the meaning of the word "harm" and was
contrary to the Service's interpretation of that phrase. Justice Scalia also
disagreed with the majority's view that the canon cannot be applied to
deprive a word of its "'independent meaning"' and argued that it was
common for words to have the same meaning when they are part of "long
lawyer listings such as this.4 89 Furthermore, he claimed that the narrow
definition of "harm" added meaning beyond the other surrounding words
by including intentional poisonings or destruction of habitat designed to
kill a particular animal or animals.490 Accordingly, Justice Scalia rejected
the majority's use of the surplusage canon to broaden the meaning of the
term "harm."
Furthermore, Justice Scalia attacked several other arguments advanced
by the majority First, simply relying on a statute's "broad purpose" to
justify reading a term expansively "is no substitute for the hard job (or in
484 See Id. at 720-25 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
" See id. at 717 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing use of "take" in Migratory
Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Agreement on the
Conservation of Polar Bears, Nov. 15, 1973, art. 1, 27 U.S.T. 3920, 3921, Geer v.
Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519,523 (1896); and 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 80, at4l1).
486 Id. at 736 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
487 See id. at 718-22 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
488 Id. at 720 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
489 Id. at 721 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 702).
490 See Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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this case, the quite simple one) of reading the whole text."N9i Second, he
argued that it was inappropriate for the majority to examine the legislative
history of the 1973 Act "when the enacted text is as clear as this," and also
that the legislative history from 1973 did not support the Service's
interpretation.492 Third, he conceded that the legislative history of the 1982
amendments clearly reveals that Congress contemplated enabling the
Secretaryto permit environmental modification, but he strongly contended
that it was inappropriate to consider this legislative history when "the text
of the amendment cannot possibly bear that asserted meamng, when placed
within the context of an Act that must be interpreted (as we have seen) not
to prohibit private environmental modification. '493 Justice Scalia main-
tamed that "[t]he neutral language of the amendment cannot possibly alter
that interpretation, nor can its legislative history be summoned forth to
contradict, rather than clarify, what is in its totality an unambiguous
statutory text.149 4 Finally, it was inappropriate for the majority to read the
regulation to contain a proximate causation or foreseeability requirement
because a court "may not uphold a regulation by adding to it even the most
reasonable of elements it does not contain. 495
5. Competing Visions of Chevron. Textualism Versus Purposivism
In SweetHome, Justice Stevens's majority opinion and Justice Scalia's
dissenting opinon are good examples of the purposivist and textualist
approaches to statutory interpretation, and, in particular, the application of
the Chevron doctrine. Because Congress had given the Secretary of Interior
broad discretion to interpret the Endangered Species Act and a liberal
interpretation of the term "harm" to include the indirect effects of habitat
modification by private landowners, Justice Stevens and the rest of the
majority used the "traditional tools of statutory construction," including
49 Id. at 726 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
492 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Chicago v Environmental Defense Fund,
511 U.S. 328, 337 (1994)). Justice Scalia also disagreed with the majority's
interpretation of the legislative history of the 1973 Act, arguing that Congress
intended that the section 5 land acquisition program would be the sole means to
address the destruction of critical habitat by private persons on private land. See id.
at 726-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
493 Id. at 730 (Scalia, 3., dissenting).
494 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund,
511 U.S. 328 (1994)).
495 Id. at 733 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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noscitur a sociis and the presumption against surplusage, to conclude that
the Service's interpretation of the word was reasonable under Chevron.496
By contrast, Justice Scalia focused on the "ordinary meaning" of the
words m the text, along with logic, to conclude that the Fish and Wildlife
Service's expansive interpretation of"harm" was inconsistent with the way
most speakers of the English language use the word, as well as its usage in
other contexts of the statute. Furthermore, he relied on four external
sources, including an 1896 Supreme Court case andBlackstone's Commen-
taries, to explain what Congress must have meant when it used the word
"1take.11497 He did not explain why it is appropriate to use these external
sources, which were not adopted by Congress or presented to the President,
while rejecting the use of legislative history because it was not subject to
adoption and presentment.4 9 Furthermore, Justice Scalia emphatically
rejected the notion that resort to a statute's broad purposes can be used to
ignore a statutory text that clearly is contrary to an agency's
interpretation.499
Justice Stevens's approach in SweetHome better reflects theunderlying
rationale of the Chevron doctrine. In light of the statute's complexity and
a prior Supreme Court case, TVA v. Hill,"'0 which emphasized that
Congress had delegated significant discretion to the Secretary and Service
to implement the statute, the majority recogmzed that it ought to be
deferential to the agency's interpretation and recognize its policymakmg
discretion. Thus, the majority used the canons as a means to affirm the
agency's interpretation if possible. There are plausible arguments for using
both the noscitur a sociis and surplusage canons to either narrow the
definition of "harm" or to argue that it must have independent meaning
beyond some of the limiting words it accompanies. To choose when the
canons can be used in a contradictory manner, the best method is to look
at the statute's overall purpose and whether deference to the agency is
496 Id. at 690-708; Chevron v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984).
497 See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 717 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing use of
"take" in Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1988 & Supp. V 1993);
Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, Nov 15, 1973, art. I, 27 U.S.T.
3920, 3921, Geer v Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 523 (1896); and 2 BLACKSTONE,
supra note 80, at 411).
498 See Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, supra note 33, at
705.
491 See supra note 491 and accompanying text.
500 TVA v Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978); see supra notes 476-80 and accom-
panying text.
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appropriate, as Justice Stevens did m Sweet Home. Justice Scalia's
emphasis on the "ordinary" meaning of the text led hun, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justice Thomas, as well as Judges Williams and Sentelle,
to apply the canons without giving deference to the agency's expertise or
the statute's broad purposes. Justice Scalia's and Judges Williams's and
Sentelle's use of the noscitur a sociis and surplusage canons to narrow the
meaning of the statute appears to have been motivated in part by a desire
to protect private property owners from an expansive reading that subjects
millions of acres to federal regulation, but their narrow reading is at odds
with Congress's broad purposes and especially the 1982 Amendments to
the Act.501
VI. A BALANCED APPROACH TO STATUTORY CANONS
A. Professor Sunstein's Hierarchy ofModern Interpretive Prnciples
Professor Sunstem has sought to update the traditional canons of
construction by developing new canons or "interpretive principles" to deal
with the types of issues that arise in the modem regulatory state. °" He
"focus[es] on norms that read legislative instructions in light of institu-
tional or substantive concerns" and does not seek to address syntactical or
congressional canons. 5 3 He acknowledges that institutional or substantive
norms are value-laden and therefore controversial, but he seeks to find
usable interpretations by seeking areas where there is sufficient consensus
or by concentrating on core constitutional requirements.", Additionally, he
seeks principles of statutory interpretation that will improve the perfor-
mance of government institutions. 55 Finally, he seeks principles that take
into account statutory functions and how statutes fail in practice. 06
Sunstem recognizes the potential for conflicts among his principles, and
seeks to provide rules of priority and harmonization.
57
His proposed principles are a major intellectual contribution to our
understanding of statutory interpretation and the operation of the modem
regulatory state, but they fail to provide a comprehensive system for
51 See supra notes 458-63, 476-80 and accompanymg text.
" See generally Sunstem, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 1, at 462-505.
503 Id. at 464.
5 See id. at 466.505 See id.
506 See id. at 466-67
507 See id. at 497-502.
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balancing competing canons or determining how broadly or narrowly to
apply a canon in a particular case. This Part will focus on applying
Professor Sunstem's principles to the cases discussed in Parts III, IV, and
V to show that they do not provide a satisfactory basis for analyzing how
the textualist approach to statutory interpretation tends toward selective use
of the canons.
1. Sunstein's Pnnciples
First, Professor Sunstem argues that the Constitution's norms provide
a starting place for statutory analysis." 8 He particularly emphasizes that
courts should use interpretive principles to vindicate constitutional norms
that tend to be underutilized.5 19 He proposes that courts vigorously apply
the canon that statutes should be interpreted to avoid not only constitutional
invalidity, but also serious constitutional doubts."' 0 He acknowledges the
argument that this canon gives judges too much discretion to limit statutes
that do not actually violate a constitutional principle and that it is appropri-
ate to limit its use.51' However, he contends that many constitutional norms
are underenforced and this canon allows courts to vindicate constitutional
principles by narrowing questionable but not necessarily invalid statutes.12
Professor Sunstem encourages courts to use clear-statement rules or
narrow construction to promote underenforced constitutional norms,
including federalism, political accountability, checks and balances, and the
nondelegation prnciple. Because in our federalist system states are
presumed to have the authority to regulate their citizens, courts should
require a clear statement before interpreting a statute to preempt state
law 511 Where Congress broadly delegates policymakmg authority to an
administrative agency, Professor Sunstem believes there is a danger that the
agency will seek to expand its authority beyond statutory limits or will try
to act in ways that avoid centralized presidential control.5 14 Especially
where agencies seek to broadly interpret their power or jurisdiction, courts
should considernarrowly construing a regulatory statute to promote agency
accountability to Congress and the President. This would provide a
5*1 See Id. at 468.
511 See id.
510 See id. at 468-69
51 See id. at 469; see also POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 310, at 285.
512 See Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 1, at 468-69.
s" See id.
514 See id. at 470.
[VOL. 86
1997-98] SELECTIVE CANONS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 605
modicum of substance to the neglected nondelegation principle that
Congress should make political choices andnot delegate excessive amounts
of lawmaking authority to agencies."'
Professor Sunstem is very concerned with protecting disadvantaged
groups and promoting individual civil rights. For example, he cites the
well-established canon that courts should interpret statutes in favor of
Native American tribes that the government has mistreated in the past.
'16
Because antidiscrimination statutes protecting minorities are generally
underenforced, Sunstem argues that courts should resolve interpretive
doubts to protect disadvantaged groups, includingwomen andmmorities.1 7
2. Sunstein 's Rules ofPrority and Harmonization
Sunstem is aware that his principles may conflict with one another.
'For example, the principle favoring state authority might collide with the
principle favoring disadvantaged groups."5 ' Nevertheless, he argues that
"[p]rneiples of harmonization and priority can in fact be developed to
resolve cases of conflict," although he acknowledges that the application
of such principles cannot be "purely mechanical" and that "[i]nevitably,
statutory construction is an exercise of practical reason, in which text,
history, and purpose interact with background understandings in the legal
culture.
5 19
Sunstem maintains that the closely allied principles of political
accountability and deliberation by politically accountable actors deserve
the highest respect.5 20 Second in Sunstem's hierarchy are other interpretive
principles derived from constitutional norms, such as "broad interpretation
of statutes protecting disadvantaged groups, against delegations of
legislative authority, in favor of state autonomy, and in favor of narrow
construction of interest-group transfers."52' Furthermore, he contends it is
possible to create a hierarchy among this group of constitutionally based
interpretive principles by, for instance, treating the principle in favor of
state autonomy on a lesser plane "than the principle in favor of protection
of disadvantaged groups, which is the product of the fourteenth amend-
"'5 See id. at 469-71.
516 See id. at 483.
517 See id. at 483-85.
511 Id. at 497
5 ,9 Id. at 497-98.
520 See id. at 498.
521 d.
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ment, a self-conscious attempt to limit the scope of state power." Indeed,
he notes that existing case law already does so.5" Finally, interpretive
principles without constitutional basis such as the promotion of regulatory
efficiency occupy the lowest rung m Sunstem's hierarchy 523
According to Sunstem, courts should try to avoid conflicts altogether
by harmonizing potentially divergent norms.524 Furthermore, courts should
take into account the degree to which an interpretive norm is violated in
deciding which to prefer.525
Sunstem criticizes the Supreme Court's decision in Pennhurst State
School & Hospital v. Halderman26 for using a clear-statement rule
designed to protect states against lawsuits.527 The Court claimed that
Congress had imposed a condition on the grant of federal funds, thereby
rejecting the clai of mentally retarded people that the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act528 created legally enforceable
rights. Sunstem argues that courts should aggressively construe statutes in
favor of the developmentally disabled because they have failed to use the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause to protect this vulnera-
ble group, and should compensate by using statutory interpretation to fulfill
the values of the clause.529 Where the values of the Fourteenth Amendment
are at issue, federalist principles supporting clear-statement rules should
bow to the protection of the disadvantaged.53
3. The Limitations of Sunstein's Model
Despite hIs best efforts, Sunstem's principles of priority and harmom-
zation do not provide a complete answer to the problems of conflicting
canons or how broadly or narrowly to apply them in a given case.531 For
instance, even if one agrees with the principle that the Fourteenth
Amendment should trump federalist clear-statement principles, there are
difficult questions to resolve depending on the degree to which the
112 Id. at 498-99
"3 See id. at 499524 See id.
'2 See id. at 499-500.526 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
527 See zd. at 17
528 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081 (1994).
529 See Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 1, at 500-02.
530 See id.
51 See Bell, supra note 155, at 137 n. 168; Moglen & Pierce, supra note 138, at
1225-27
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Amendment or states' rights principles are implicated. One might argue
that the reluctance of the Pennhurst Court to apply the Fourteenth
Amendment to protect the developmentally disabled means that federalist
concerns should take precedence. Seminole Tribe v. Florida532 provides
another example. One might argue that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
only marginally relates to the disadvantaged status of Native American
groups in United States history, and, accordingly, that states' sovereign
immunity should take precedence over any concern for the "right" of a
disadvantaged group to make gambling profits.533 Professor Sunstem's four
levels of priority and attempts at providing additional guidance simply do
not completely answer how to balance competing constitutional norms that
may be implicated to a lesser or greater degree in a given case.5 34
In addition, one may disagree with some of Professor Sunstem's
norms. He raises legitimate issues about agencies defining their own
jurisdiction - foxes guarding henhouses - but does not fully appreciate the
possibility that judges, especially textualists, may give lip service to
Chevron and then conclude that an agency's interpretation is contrary to
their own interpretation of a "clear" statute.
5 35
Even Professor Sunstem's proposals to promote regulatory efficiency
are open to criticism. Because the beneficiaries of environmental programs
usually are diffuse and politically disorganized, whereas the targets of such
regulation normally are concentrated and well-organized, Professor
Sunstem suggests that judges could aggressively construe regulatory
statutes to protect the environment.536 On the other hand, the influence of
unions and workers might create overzealous occupational regulation; this
suggests that judges should narrowly construe such statutes.537 While these
collective action problems are real, interpreting specific environmental or
occupational provisions may raise countervailing or contradictory issues
that cloud how a judge should interpret a statutory provision.538 For
instance, how narrowly or aggressively should a judge interpret an
environmental statute that also involves significant occupational issues?
Professor Sunstem deserves praise for his brilliant effort to create new
interpretive principles for the modem regulatory state and for hIs attempt
532 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
533 See id. at 1123-24.
511 See Bell, supra note 155, at 137 n.168.
131 See supra notes 340, 344, 392-95, 412-18, 481-95 and accompanying text.
536 See Sunstem, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 1, at 478.
See id. at 478-79.
538 See Moglen & Pierce, supra note 138, at 1225-27
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to provide rules of priority and harmonization to resolve conflicts among
competing norms. Nevertheless, his model does not completely address
how to rank, balance, or apply the canons. There is a certain truth m
Llewellyn's criticism that, for any given canon, there is usually a conflict-
mg canon. Nevertheless, as both Llewellyn and Sunstem suggest, there are
better and worse ways to apply the canons in light of practical experience
and the interpreter's situation sense. 39
B. Against Textualism: A More Balanced Approach to Canons
While it is difficult to develop a model for reconciling canons that
always works, it is possible to recognize where judges have applied canons
either too broadly or narrowly Textualist judges have too freely invoked
clear-statement rules to protect federalist concerns and have not applied the
canons vigorously enough to protect civil liberties or executive interpreta-
tions of regulatory statutes.
1. Clear-Statement Rules
a. State Sovereign Immunity
Commentators often have argued that federalist norms are likely to be
underenforced because the political branches do not have a stake m
protecting structural values that protect states against the expansion of
national power, because courts have failed to develop principled constitu-
tional limitations required by the Tenth Amendment and the Commerce
Clause, and because "the principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure
the role of the States in the federal system lies m the structure of the
Federal government itself."5" Accordingly, Professor Sunstem, who values
individual rights highly, acknowledges that federalism is likely to be an
underenforced value and that clear-statement rules are an appropriate
means to protect federalist values against overly expansive judicial
readings of federal statutes.54'
The Supreme Court's aggressive use of clear-statement principles to
protect states' rights raises serious questions about whether the Court has
539 See supra notes 100, 120-25, 502-07 and accompanying text.
540 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985); see
Eskridge & Fnckey, Quasi-Constitutional Clear Statement Rules, supra note 132,
at 630-33.
541 See Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 1, at 469, 498-502.
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gone too far to protect states at the expense of national interests. Because
textualist judges ignore evidence of congressional intent m a statute's
legislative history, clear-statement rules are counter-majoritanan. They
place a significant burden on Congress to explicitly regulate state behavior
even though the legislative process is often haphazard about using exact
language.
542
Furthermore, in a series of cases - New York,5 3 Seminole Tribe v.
Florida,54 Lopez,545 and Prntz - the Court has restricted the authority of
Congress to regulate the behavior of state officials and arguably shifted the
balance of power from the national to the state level. While the Court since
the late 1930s has aggressively read the Commerce Clause to expand
national power, one may now argue that national authority is now being
underenforced by the combination of a narrow reading of the Commerce
Clause, a broad reading of state sovereign immunity, and the application
of clear-statement rules m order to narrow federal regulation of state
interests. In addition, Gregory47 and similar cases use such vague and
overly broad language and categories to protect "traditional" or "core" state
interests that the danger now lies with the underenforcement of federal
statutes.548
b. Federal Sovereign Immunity
The principle of federal sovereign immunity is far less compelling than
the need to preserve some state immunity in light of encroaching national
power. There is a separation-of-powers argument that federal sovereign
immunity is needed to prevent courts from encroaching on congressional
or executive authority 549 Clear-statement rules, however, often result in
courts ignoring congressional intent by demanding far more explicit
statements oflegislative intent than is customary 550 Moreover, historically,
Congress often has waived federal sovereign immunity, and, accordingly,
542 See Eskridge & Fnckey, Quasi-Constitutional ClearStatementRules, supra
note 132, at 630-34, 643-44.
541 New York v United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
14 Seminole Tribe v Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
5 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
16 Prmtz v United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
47Gregory v Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
"See supra notes 185-207 and accompanying text.
'9 See generally Harold Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45
VAND. L. REv 1529, 1530-32, 1539-40 (1992); Nagle, supra note 208, at 813-19.
5 0See Nagle, supra note 208, at 818-19, 834-36.
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it is difficult to argue that it is a core value that needs strong judicial
protection through the use of a clear-statement rule.551 A weaker presump-
tion of federal sovereign immunity is more appropriate to protect the
United States from excessive suits than is a super-strong clear-statement
rule that ignores legislative purpose and legislative intent or demands
unequivocal textual language.552Ardestani,5s Nordic Village,554 and Ohio555
all ignored significant indications that Congress intended to waive the
United States' sovereign immunity, and, therefore, thwarted the legislature
for no strong policy reason. Williams's56 pragmatic approach to the
Internal Revenue Code's text and the situation faced by taxpayers reflects
a more appropriate approach to statutory interpretation. Lane,557 however,
suggests that the Court is still committed to its flawed super-strong clear-
statement approach to waiving federal sovereign immunity
2. Individual Liberties
Textualist judges sometimes employ judicial canons to protect
individual rights, including the rule of lenity in construing criminal
statutes.s s What is notable, however, is that the Court in recent years has
been-more aggressive about using clear-statement rules to protect states'
rights or even federal sovereign immunity than it has been to safeguard
individual liberties. Thus, in Arabian American Oil Co., 59 the Court
applied the principle against extraterritorial application of statutes to deny
application of a central civil rights statute, Title VII, to protect an American
citizen from discrimination by an American company even though the
likelihood of controversy with foreign laws was minimal.5 60 Here,
Sunstem's principle that the values of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause should take precedence over lesser norms, such as
avoiding interference with the conduct of foreign relations, suggests that
the Court should have decided that Title VII does apply at least to
American citizens employed by American citizens, especially in light of
551 See id. at 834.
512 See id.
5S3 Ardestam v INS, 502 U.S. 129 (1991).
5S4 United States v Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992).
's' United States Dep't of Energy v Ohio, 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
556 Williams v United States, 514 U.S. 527 (1995).
-57 Lane v Pena, 116 S. Ct. 2092 (1996).
558 See supra notes 261-91 and accompanying text.
s EEOC v Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991).560 See supra notes 298-307 and accompanying text.
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Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion, which pointed out strong evidence
m Title VII's legislative history that Congress intended the statute to have
extraterritorial application.
In applying the principle against construing a statute in a way that
raises serious constitutional doubts, the Court needs to disregard as much
as possible its substantive biases and use clear-statement rules as a means
to protect individual liberties. In Rust v. Sullivan,61 Justice O'Connor's
application of a clear-statement approach requurng Congress to clearly
express its desire to limit federal funding of abortion counseling was an
appropriate means of avoiding a constitutional question while leaving the
issue open until there is a clearer demonstration of majoritanan sentiment
in Congress.562 Indeed, the willingness of textualist judges to apply clear-
statement rules to protect federalism while refusing to do so in Rust is
striking.
There is an argument that federalist values are more likely to be
underenforced than First Amendment or other civil liberties principles, and,
therefore, that it is more appropriate to invoke clear-statement rules in
federalist cases than in those involving individual liberties.563 There are
stronger reasons, however, for believing that individual rights are likely to
be underenforced because of the time and cost of doing so, and, at the very
least, courts ought to be as willing to use clear-statement rules to narrow
statutes that arguably harm individual civil liberties as they are to protect
state sovereignty or federal immunity from suit.5"
3. The Case for Deference to Executive Agencies
While it may be entirely appropriate for judges to actively employ
canons when they are the primary interpreters of a statute, a different
situation is presented when they review an agency interpretation of a
statute. Chevron stated or strongly implied that agencies generally possess
greater expertise than most Article III judges about the often highly
technical issues in modem administrative statutes, and pointed out that
agencies are closer to the political branches, especially because they are
under the supervision of the President, than thejudiciary 565 While agencies
56 Rust v Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
S62ee supra notes 322-33 and accompanying text.
11 See Eskndge & Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional ClearStatementRules, supra
note 132, at 630-33.
564 See id. at 630-34, 643-44.
161 See Mank, supra note 33, at 1278-84; supra notes 348-78 and accompanying
text.
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should not change a previous interpretation without a good reason, in
Chevron itself and subsequent decisions,. the Court has emphasized that
agencies may change the interpretation of an ambiguous statute if there are
reasonable policy grounds for doing So.1
66
Furthermore, the strongest reason for allowing agency interpretations
to prevail is that many modem regulatory statutes are intransitive; that is,
the statute has no real intent or meaning and Congress has left it to the
agency to give it meaning, perhaps after consulting with a small "interpre-
tive community" of regulated firms and public interest groups that have
highly specialized knowledge about the subject matter. 67 Because
Congress writes most modem regulatory statutes for the benefit or control
of "a small community of lawyers, regulators, and people subject to their
specific regulations," '568 an agency's interpretation of that interpretive
community's understanding of the language should prevail over how
ordinary users of the English language might interpret the statute using the
traditional canons of construction.5 69 Judicial deference to an agency's
filling in of the gaps in an intransitive statute is most appropriate where
Congress has explicitly or implicitly delegated rulemaking authority to the
agency, but is somewhat important even when the agency merely has the
power to issue an informal interpretive opinion about a statute's
meaning.
570
While Justice Scalia is uncomfortable with the notion that Congress
may actually delegate lawmaking authority to an executive agency, he is
able to essentially sanction this result by treating Chevron as an across-the-
board presumption that, in the case of ambiguity, agency discretion is
meant.5 ' Because it often is a fiction to say that Congress had a specific
intent about an issue when it enacted a statute, it was appropriate for the
Supreme Court in Chevron to adopt the fiction or presumption that
Congress intended to delegate lawmaking or interpretive authority to the
agency, which is most likely to know how to interpret the statute in light
1
66 See supra notes 348-78 and accompanying text.
567 See Mank, supra note 33, at 1280-8 1, Moglen & Pierce, supra note 138, at
1207-15; Edward L. Rubm, Modern Statutes, Loose Canons, and the Limits of
PracticalReason: A Response to Farber andRoss, 45 VAND. L. REV 579,581-83
(1992) (discussing "the varying degrees of transitivity that modem statutes
possess"); Shapiro, supra note 86, at 955-56.
568 Ross, supra note 64, at 1057
-69 See id. at 1057-62, 1067; see Mank, supra note 33, at 1280-8 1.
570 See Shapiro, supra note 86, at 955-56.
5 See Scalia, supra note 352, at 515.
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of changing social, political, and technical factors and in light of the views
of the small interpretive community most affected by that interpretation.572
Accordingly, the Chevron principle that Congress has delegated
lawmaking or interpretive authority to fill gaps in or interpret ambiguous
statutes shouldprevail over vanous canons that favor narrow interpretation
of a statute or continuity unless a judge strongly believes that the agency
interpretation is contrary to the enacting legislature's intent or purpose in
enacting the statute. The difficulty of applying interpretive principles in the
modem regulatory state suggests the wisdom of the Chevron decision.
Whether to read a statute narrowly or aggressively involves a number of
political, technical, social, and economic issues. It often is not obvious
whether judges or agencies are better qualified to address the different
facets of a regulatory problem. Article III judges might be less susceptible
to direct political influence by orgamzed lobbyists than are agencies, but
also less able to understandthe practical problems of implementation. Even
strong proponents of active judicial review and implementation of
interpretive principles for the modem regulatory state acknowledge that
agencies usually possess specialized fact-finding and policy-making
competence superior to thejudiciary 573 Chevron creates a simple presump-
tion that if a statute is ambiguous, courts assume that Congress has
delegatedpolicymaking authority to an agency, especially if the agency has
rulemakmg authority 574 Chevron's across-the-board presumption is more
workable than any proposed interpretive principle for the modem
regulatory state.
In some cases, the Chevron canon providing a presumption of
deference to administrative agencies must yield to countervailing constitu-
tional and institutional principles. Despite Professor Sunstem's attempt to
provide a hierarchy of interpretive principles, it is difficult to formulate
precise rules for when an agency interpretation must yield even to a
constitutional principle. In Rust, if there really had been no significant
controversy about the ability of physicians to communicate with their
patients, then the majority would have been right not to Invoke the canon
against raising constitutional difficulties and to defer to the agency's
interpretation of the statute.575 Both Justice Blackmun's and Justice
" See generally Moglen & Pierce, supra note 138, at 1207-15. Butsee Cass R.
Sunstem, Exchange, Principles, Not Fictions, 57 U. CHI. L. REV 1247, 1256-58
(1990) (arguing that statutory interpretation should be based not on fictions, but
instead on pnnciples).
5" See Sunstem, Law and Administration, supra note 86, at 2117
574 See supra notes 348-78 and accompanying text.
575 See supra notes 348-78 and accompanying text.
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O'Connor's dissents, however, made a more persuasive case that the
agency's interpretation should not be granted deference because it raised
significant constitutional issues that would better be avoided. 6 Chevron
does not require judges to abdicate their role m protecting constitutional
rights and preventing agencies from flagrantly ignoring congressional
intent.
Commentators who have argued that textualist judges are especially
likely to defer to executive agency interpretations because such judges
refuse to consider legislative history have failed to consider that textualism
as a methodology often leads judges to believe they can find the one
"correct" interpretation or "plain meaning" of a statute regardless of how
an agency interprets the statute.577 In addition, because many textualists
also are strong defenders of private property interests, they may be. subtly
biased against broad agency interpretations of regulatory authority even if
an expansive interpretation is reasonable and consistent with congressional
intent or purpose. 78 The possible bias of many textualist judges in favor of
sovereign immunity and private property may partially explain why they
often seem more inclined to favor canons such as clear-statement rules that
narrow statutory intent rather than those that enlarge it to serve a statute's
broad remedial purposes.579 Textualist judges should be aware of the
possible bias of their methodology in favor of narrow statutory interpreta-
tion. They should resist, to the extent possible, their instinctual need to
invoke Chevron less often because the textualist method allows them, more
often than interpreters who consider legislative hstory, to find the correct
meaning of the text.
5 1
0
CONCLUSION
In applying traditional canons such as the plam-meaning rule, noscitur
a sociis, and expressio unius est exclusio alterus, and more modem clear-
statement rules, such as the presumption against extraterritoriality, Justice
Scalia and many other modem or "new" textualists have tended to apply
them rigidly to find that a statute has a single, often narrow, meaning.
Instead, Justice Scalia should remember hIs own advice that canons are
76 See supra notes 348-78 and accompanying text.
... See supra notes 340, 344, 392-95, 412-18, 481-95 and accompanying text.
578 See supra-notes 421-24 and accompanying text.
... See supra notes 152-249 and accompanying text.
580 See supra notes 340, 344, 392-95, 412-18, 421-24, 481-95 and accom-
panying text.
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"simply one indication of meaning" and cannot provide an absolute guide
to statutory meaning.58' IfJustice Scalia and certain other textualists treated
the plain-meaning rule, various syntactical canons, and several clear-
statement rules merely as guides that could yield to contrary indications of
statutory purpose or intent, there would be much less controversy about the
new textualism.
It is striking that textualist judges aggressively use clear-statement
rules to protect state sovereignty or federal sovereign immunity, but were
unwilling to use similar principles in Rust, a civil liberties case.8 2 Courts
need to apply clear-statement rules in both federalist and civil liberties
cases, where the danger ofjudicialunderenforcement is significant. Indeed,
with the Court's recent restrictions on the commerce power to regulate
states, the unwillingness of the Court to treat individual liberties with the
same degree of care as states' rights or federal sovereign immunity is
striking. Furthermore, the unwillingness of textualist judges to consider
legislative history heightens the danger that their use of clear-statement
rules to protect state concerns or federal sovereign immunity will ignore
majoritanan goals.
Many commentators believed that textualist judges were likely to
invoke Chevron frequently to protect executive power and because their
methodology refuses to consider legislative history that might show clear
congressional intent, but textualist judges seem less likely to employ
Chevron both because they believe they can interpret a statute's text
without any need to defer to an agency interpretation and because they
favor restricting government regulation of private property 5 3 The
confidence of textualist judges in their ability to interpret complex
regulatory statutes is misplaced. As Chevron recognized, in many cases,
Congress writes intransitive statutes where there are gaps the legislature
expects the agency to fill.584 In the case of intransitive statutes, it is folly for
a textualist or a nontextualist judge to find the one correct original intent
or purpose, and a judge should defer to any reasonable agency interpreta-
tion.5
85
If Professor Sunstem is unable to provide a comprehensive model for
ranking and harmonizing various canons of construction, it may not be
581 SCALIA, supra note 105, at 27
512 See Rust v Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
583 See supra notes 340, 344, 392-95, 412-18, 421-24, 481-95 and accom-
panying text.584 See supra notes 567-74 and accompanying text.
58 See supra notes 567-74 and accompanying text.
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possible to do so. Nevertheless, it is possible to say that textualist judges
too often use clear-statement rules and a willful blindness to legislative
history to protect federalist values or even federal sovereign immunity,
while failing to apply clear-statement rules to narrow statutes that threaten
individual liberties. Furthermore, textualist judges often use canons of
construction to disregard agency statutory interpretations while ignoring
Chevron's principle of judicial restraint and deference, m appropriate
circumstances, to agency expertise. Textualists have shifted the canons too
far in favor of states' rights as opposed to majoritanan national values. It
is time to restore judicial balance by reemphasizing canons protecting
individual liberties, congressional intent, and also, perhaps paradoxically,
executive authority
